# R1---Fullerton—Opensource

# 1NC---Round 1---Fullertown

## OFF

### 1NC---T

#### The resolution should define the division of ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition. Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### ‘Antitrust laws’ are statutes.

Grimes ’20 [Charles W; 2020; editor of this Licensing Update and Law Professor at Ava Maria Law School; Wolters Kluwer, “Licensing Update,” https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf]

§13.02 ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Their ‘scope’ is defined by government.

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### Vote negative:

#### 1. Clash: debate requires a predictable topic to motivate in depth research that yields the values of negation and argument refinement. Their interp explodes limits, allows affirmative conditionality, and makes debate a one-sided monologue devoid of argumentation which turns the case.

#### 2. Fairness: the neg should win on average 50% of the time. Entering a competitive activity proves their arguments are shaped by a drive to win. The insurmountable advantage of being affirmative under their unfair model is a reason they should lose.

### 1NC---K

#### Haptics has offered moralism when it needs to offer organization for Climate Maoism – refusal to seize the state from the capitalist class forecloses a dictatorship of the proletariat

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

Let’s look at this third option more closely. To build towards an eco-communist revolution, we need to avoid both a politics of pure negation and a politics of “critical affirmation.” As Marx argued, revolutions need dialectics. They need us to find what Fredric Jameson calls the “dialectical ambivalence” in capitalism. This means training ourselves to locate aspects of the present that point beyond themselves and towards the communist horizon. Lenin did precisely this after the outbreak of the First World War. Rather than joining with the majority of the socialist parties of the Second International in capitulating to imperialist war, and rather than wallowing in melancholia following the betrayal of so many of his German comrades as they voted for war credits, Lenin saw in the war an opportunity for revolutionary advance. Those interested in the emancipation of the working class needed to fight not for peace but for the dialectical conversion of nationalist war to civil war. The war, and the collapse of the Second International, was the opportunity for something new.

What would it mean to think dialectically about the GND? We think it would mean stripping the policy’s reformist content away from its revolutionary form. For decades environmental movements in the capitalist core have busied themselves fighting for local solutions to global problems: cooperatives, local currencies, urban agriculture, and ethical consumerism. As these experiments blossomed, the climate crisis continued unabated. More pipelines were built, more indigenous land was stolen, more fires raged, and more species flickered out of existence.

In their form the GND and GIR put localism aside. Both recognize that the climate crisis demands a state-led, centrally planned, and global response. They take for granted that we need a state to intervene on behalf of nature and workers against capital. The fact that the GND and GIR promise to do this is what makes capitalists fear them. Those who are excited about the promise of the GND—such as Riofrancos—have similarly turned towards the state as a terrain of struggle and a locus of power. Consciously or not, these movements have learned from the failures of Climate Camp, Occupy, and the Movement of Squares. It is not enough to suspend the normal running of things. Taking responsibility means taking power and organizing society in what Marx called the interests of “freely associated workers,” or more controversially, the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The struggles to implement the GND and GIR tell us that environmentalists are increasingly aware of the need to seize the state—and the need to develop a fighting organization with the capacity to do so.

Against State Denialism

Ironically, at almost the precise moment that progressive movements have become conscious of the necessity of a climate response operating at the necessary scale, the Marxist left has taken a state-phobic turn. Consider “disaster communism.” Confronted with the choice between ruin or revolution, disaster communism opts for ruin as the path to revolution—without considering the form of association necessary to ensure that the revolution ushers in a more equal, just, and sustainable world rather than insulated groups struggling with each other over resources. In lieu of the revolutionary subject emphasized in the Marxist tradition, disaster communism turns to climate breakdown as the agent of history.

Drawing on Rebecca Solnit’s book A Paradise Built in Hell, a study of how practices of mutual aid and collectivity arise in the aftermath of crises, disaster communists argue that we do not need to seize the state because the state will be washed away, along with the capitalist system itself, as the full force of the climate crisis crashes down around us. While Solnit emphasizes the ephemerality of “disaster communities,” disaster communists ask how these communities might be sustained and even flourish well beyond the punctual point of a climatic disaster wrought by capitalism. Theirs is a vision of communism arising, triumphantly, from capital’s ashes. Vision may be too strong a term here: for the most part, disaster communism is a hope, a screen covering over the need for organization and planning at a scale that can produce a form of life suitable for billions of people and nonhuman species.

Responses to the Covid-19 pandemic illustrate the point. Even as mobilized volunteers and mutual aid can meet real needs by distributing meals, assisting neighbors, and coordinating webinars, they are inadequate to the most demanding tasks of developing and administering tests for the virus, securing hospital beds in intensive care units, producing and distributing respirators, and providing adequate protective equipment at the necessary scale. Mutual aid is inspiring, but it’s not enough—it can’t stop the hoarders and profiteers, pay hospital bills and unemployment insurance, release prisoners and detainees. It doesn’t scale, particularly when the prevailing logic comes from the market. That capital accumulation takes place through dispossession as well as exploitation brings home the real limit of mutual aid: poor and working people do not own the means of production and therefore production does not meet social needs.

Furthermore, in extreme capitalist countries like the US and the UK, social and political diversity means that many do not voluntarily comply with public health recommendations. Employers insist that employees come to work. Students spend spring break at the beach. Individuals approach their own situations in terms of exceptions, reasons why they don’t need to comply with directives. Orders from the state don’t eliminate all these exceptions. But they reduce them substantially, most significantly by preventing employers from requiring workers to put themselves at risk. Were the state used as an instrument of working class power, it would, at a minimum, guarantee that workers would continue to be paid, that the health and well-being of people would be the focus of government attention. The pandemic demonstrates a truth that the left’s responses to climate change have been slow to acknowledge: global problems require a centrally planned response with all the tools that are at the disposal of the state. Failing to seize hospitals, industry, banks, and logistical networks from the capitalist class results in needless death—and gives a green light to disaster capitalism.

Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright’s 2018 book Climate Leviathan provides another state-phobic response to the climate crisis. Mann and Wainwright predict four possible resolutions to the climate crisis. The first is “Climate Leviathan.” This is a global sovereign power that would act in the interests of capitalist states and global capital to limit the effects of climate breakdown. This is effectively the scenario hoped for by Chakrabarty. The second is “Climate Behemoth.” Here, states cannot agree to constitute a global sovereign power and so the crisis is tackled by international capital in the interests of international capital. The third is “Climate Mao.” In this scenario a single authoritarian sovereign power, most likely China, leads global mitigation and adaptation efforts. Finally, their fourth and preferred scenario is “Climate X.” This would be a so-far-nonexistent social movement that struggles to resolve the crisis in a way that is simultaneously anti-capitalist and anti-sovereign.

Alyssa Battistoni and Patrick Bigger have already written compelling Marxist critiques of Climate Leviathan. We don’t need to rehearse them here. We note, however, that responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have resembled Climate Behemoth and Climate Mao. While the US, UK, and EU have been slow to use state power to coordinate either within or among the themselves, instead following the dictates and interests of capital in their structuring of economic responses to the pandemic, China has modeled both rigorous state action with respect to quarantines and international leadership with respect to provision of medical aid. What’s important for our argument here is that Mann and Wainwright’s state denialism prevents them from conceiving the state as a form for the collective power of working people, an instrument through which we remake the economy in the service of human and nonhuman life.

Jasper Bernes offers a third state-phobic Marxist response to the climate crisis. A proponent of communization theory, Bernes argues that communism means “the immediate abolition of money and wages, of state power, and of administrative centralization.” Absent something like a state, how is a just response to the climate crisis even possible? Should we assume that it will spontaneously emerge as a result of disparate local disaster communisms? Should we assume that access to food, water, living space, and capacities for self-defense will be equally distributed, that by some miracle the immediate abolition of money and wages will leave everyone in the same position? The pandemic gives us insight into the inability of the communization approach to respond to catastrophe: when millions who have been dependent on the wage are without it, they require centralized state power to seize the means of production and distribution and administer both on the scale necessary to meet social needs. The issue isn’t the power of the state. It’s the class wielding state power.

#### Capitalism ensures climate apartheid and extinction

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

We know how the first paragraph begins. We’ve read about the changing climate for over twenty years, infrequently at first and then daily until we couldn’t deny it any longer. The world is burning. The oceans are heating up and acidifying. Species are dying in the Sixth Great Extinction. Koalas have replaced polar bears as the charismatic species whose dwindling numbers bring us to tears. Millions are displaced and on the move, only to be met with fences, borders, and death.

We’ve read the news and it keeps getting worse. As pandemics spread, as the climate crisis continues unabated, the imperatives of capital prevent state action on anything but protecting banks and corporations. Since 1988, when human-induced climate change was officially recognized by the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the oil and gas sector has doubled its contribution to global warming. The industry emitted as much greenhouse gas over the twenty-eight years after 1988 as it had in the 237 years since the beginning of the industrial age. Regular reports announce that the atmospheric impact of these emissions is manifesting faster than scientists previously expected. The IPCC clock tells us that we have eleven years to prevent warming from rising more than 1.5 degrees above preindustrial levels. Some places on earth already hit that mark in the summer of 2019. “Climate change”—that innocuous moniker preferred by Republican political consultant Frank Lutz and adopted by the George W. Bush administration because “global warming” seemed too apocalyptic—has moved from seeming far away and impossible to being here, now, and undeniable. This has not stopped the United States and Canada from providing economic relief funds in the wake of coronavirus to oil and gas companies.

Those least responsible for climate change, those who have suffered the most from capitalism’s colonizing and imperial drive, are on the frontlines of the climate catastrophe. How to find clean water amidst never-ending drought? How to gather needed herbs, food, and firewood amidst rapid deforestation? How to survive the floods and fires? Centuries of colonialism, exploitation, and war undermine people’s capacities to survive and thrive, hitting poor people, women, children, people with disabilities, already disadvantaged racialized and national minorities, and the elderly hardest of all. According to a UN report, “We risk a ‘climate apartheid’ scenario where the wealthy pay to escape overheating, hunger and conflict while the rest of the world is left to suffer.” Capitalism has always permitted some to flourish by forcing others to fight for survival. The climate crisis—and now the coronavirus—intensifies these dynamics into a global class war. In Marx’s words, “ruin or revolution is the watchword” for our times.

#### Vote neg for Maoist ethics against capitalist apartheid – only unifying the colonial underclass through a People’s Liberation Army can destroywhite capitalist civilization and institute a World Black Dictatorship

Kelley and Etsche 99 (Robin D.G. Kelley, Robin Davis Gibran Kelley (born March 14, 1962) is the Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA.[1][2] From 2006 to 2011, he was Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California (USC),[3] and from 2003 to 2006 he was the William B. Ransford Professor of Cultural and Historical Studies at Columbia University. From 1994 to 2003, he was a professor of history and Africana Studies at New York University (NYU) as well the chairman of NYU's history department from 2002 to 2003.; and Betsy Etsche, Assistant Prof of American Studies at University of Kansas. “Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution.” Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society. V1 N4. P18-20 //shree) Note: RAM = Revolutionary Action Movement founded by Freeman, Max Stanford, and Wanda Marshall.

Maoism’s emphasis on revolutionary ethics and moral transformation, in theory at least, resonated with black religious traditions (as wells as American Protestantism more generally), and like the Nation of Islam, black Maoists preached self-restraint, order, and discipline. It is quite possible that in the midst of a counterculture that embodied elements of hedonism and drug use, a new wave of student and working-class radicals found Maoist ethics attractive. On his return from China, Robert Williams – in many respects RAM’s founding father – insisted that all young black activists “undergo personal and moral transformation. There is a need for a stringent revolutionary code of moral ethics. Revolutionaries are instruments of righteousness.” For black revolutionaries, the moral and ethical dimension of Mao’s thought centered on the notion of personal transformation. It was a familiar lesson, embodied in the lives of Malcolm X and (later) George Jackson: the idea that one possesses the revolutionary will to transform himself. (These narratives are almost exclusively male despite the growing number of memoirs by radical black women). Whether or not RAM members lived by the “Code of Cadres,” Maoist ethics ultimately served to reinforce Malcolm’s status as a revolutionary role model.

RAM’s twelve-point program called for the development of freedom schools, national black student organizations, rifle clubs, black farmer cooperatives – not just for economic development but to keep “community and guerilla forces going for a while” – and a liberation guerilla army made up of youth and unemployed. RAM placed special emphasis on internationalism, pledging support for national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as the adoption of “Pan-African socialism.” In line with Cruse’s seminal essay, “Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American,” RAM members saw themselves as colonial subjects fighting a “colonial war at home.” As Stanford wrote in an internal document, titled “Projects and Problems of the Revolutionary Movement.” (1964), “RAM’s position is that the Afro-American is not a citizen of the USA, denied his rights, but rather he is a colonial subject enslaved. This position says that the Black people in the USA are a captive nation suppressed and that their fight is not for integration into the white community but one of national liberation.”

As colonial subjects with a right to self-determination, RAM saw Afro-America as a de facto member of the nonaligned nations. RAM members even identified themselves as part of the “Bandung world,” going so far as to hold a conference in November 1964 in Nashville called “The Black Revolution’s Relationship to the Bandung World.” In a 1965 article published in RAM’s journal Black America, members started to develop a theory of “Bandung Humanism” or “Revolutionary Black Internationalism,” which argued that the battle between Western imperialism and the Third World – more than the battle between labor and capital – represented the most fundamental contradiction in our time. They linked the African-American freedom struggle with what was happening in China, Zanzibar, Cuba, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Algeria, and they characterized their work as part of Mao’s international strategy of encircling Western capitalist countries and challenging imperialism. After 1966, the term “Bandung Humanism” was dropped entirely and replaced with “Black Internationalism.”

Precisely what “Black Internationalism” meant was laid out in an incredibly bold thirty-six-page pamphlet published by RAM in 1966, titled The World Black Revolution. Loosely patterned on the Communist Manifesto, the pamphlet identified strongly with China against both the capitalist West and the Soviet empire. The “emergence of Revolutionary China began to polarize caste and class contradictions within the world, in both the bourgeoisie [sic] imperialist camp and also in the European bourgeois communist-socialist camp. In other words, China was the wedge that sharpened contradictions between colonial peoples and the West. Rejecting the idea that socialist revolution will arise in the developed countries of the West, RAM insisted that the only true revolutionary solution is the “dictatorship of the world by the Black Underclass through World Black Revolution.” Of course, the authors were not working from today’s definitions; RAM used “underclass” to encompass all peoples of color in Asia, Latin American, Africa, and elsewhere; the “Black Underclass” was merely a synonym for the colonial world. China was in a bitter fight to defend its own freedom. Now the rest of the “black” world must follow suit: The Black Underclass has only one alternative to free itself of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and neo-colonialism; that is to completely destroy Western (bourgeois) civilization (the cities of the world) through a World Black Revolution and establishing a Revolutionary World Black Dictatorship can bring about the end of exploitation of man by mankind and the new revolutionary world be created. To coordinate this revolution, RAM called for the creation of a Black International and the creation of a “People’s Liberation Army on a world scale.” For all of its strident nationalism, The World Black Revolution concludes that black nationalism “is really internationalism.” Only by demolishing white nationalism/white power can liberation be achieved for everyone. Not only will national boundaries be eliminated with the “dictatorship” of the Black Underclass,” but “the need for nationalism in its aggressive form will be eliminated.” This is a pretty remarkable statement given RAM’s social and ideological roots. But rather than representing a unified position, the statement reflects various tensions that persisted through RAM’s history. On one side were nationalists who felt that revolutionaries should fight for the black nation first and build socialism separate from the rest of the United States. On the other side were socialists like James and Grace Boggs who wanted to know who would rule the “white” nation and what such a presence would mean for black freedom. They also rejected efforts to resurrect the “Black Nation” thesis—the old Communist line that in black-majority countries of the South (the “black belt”) have a right to secede from the union. The Boggses contended that the real source of power lies in the cities, not the rural black belt. In January 1965, James Boggs resigned from his post as Ideological Chairman.

## Case

### 1NC---Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1. They have no intrinsic benefit to specifically reading revolution in a minor key within the debate space and thus no reason to affirm their strategy.

#### 2. Movements don’t spill up---competition means you ally yourself with people who vote for you and alienate those who are forced to debate you ensuring the failure of the movement.

#### 3. The regurgitation of knowledge from the 1AC proves that it is not a departure from the status quo, but rather gets coopted by academia.

### 1NC---Ballot

#### The role of the judge is to make a provisional judgment of win/loss in one debate.

#### Ballots as forming subjects bad

Karlberg 3 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE & CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left\*\* under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facng us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Visual Colonialism Turn – 1AC Vourloumis’ claim that we sit in “broken bodies in a queer utopian commons” replicates somatopolitics

Oyewumi 99 (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

In my book titled, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Discourses of Gender, I argued that Western thought and social practice through time have been characterized by the idea that biology is destiny, and that this biological determinism has led to the conception of society as being constituted as a body and by bodies: male bodies, female bodies, Jewish bodies, white bodies, and black bodies; with each body type indicating social ranking and worth. Consequently, since the body is at the base of all social categories, there are ultimately no social categories independent of biology. I contrast this Western conceptualization with the Yoruba in Nigeria, in which social categories that are not based on the body, and which therefore are truly social, not biological. In view of the visual logic of Western thought as noted by a number of scholars; I contend that the determinative character of the body in constituting social categories is related to the privileging of vision over other senses in the apprehension of reality. Given the binary oppositions that are at the core of Western thinking and the tunnel vision that results from over-reliance on "the gaze," it is not surprising that categories are narrowly conceptualized, rigid and unyielding. The focus is on one body part at a time

#### Somatopolitics justifies genocide

Oyewumi 99 (OYERONKE. teaches in the Dept. of Black Studies at University of California at Santa Barbara, "Multiculturalism or Multibodism: On the Impossible Intersections of Race and Gender in American White Feminist and Black Nationalist Discourses(1)." The Western Journal of Black Studies 23.3 (1999): 182. Academic OneFile. Web. 5 Mar. 2010.)

The notion of society that emerges from this conception is that society is constituted by bodies and as a body. I am using the concept "body" in two ways: first, as a metonymy for biology, and secondly, to draw attention to the sheer physicality which seems to attend Being in Western culture. Here, the reference is to the corporeal body as well as metaphors of the body. The body has a logic all its own, and it is believed that just by looking at it, one can determine people's social location and their thought, or lack thereof. As Naomi Scheman puts it in her discussion of "The Body Politic" in premodern Europe, The ways people knew their places in the world had to do with their bodies and the histories of those bodies, and when they violated those prescriptions for those places, their bodies were punished, often spectacularly. One's place in the body politic was as natural as the places of the organs in one's body and political disorder, as unnatural as the shifting and displacement of those organs (186). Similarly, Elizabeth Grosz remarks on what she calls the "depth" of the body in modern Western societies: Our [Western] body forms are considered expressions of an interior, not inscriptions on a flat surface. By constructing a soul or psyche for itself, the "civilized body" forms libidinal flows, sensations, experiences, and intensities into needs, wants ... The body becomes a text, a system of signs to be deciphered, read, and read into. Social law is incarnated, "corporealized," correlatively, bodies are textualized, read by others as expressive of the subject's psychic interior. A storehouse of inscriptions and messages between its external and internal boundaries, it generates or constructs the body's movement into "behavior," which then have interpersonally and socially identifiable meanings and functions within a social system [emphasis added] (198). Since the body is the bedrock on which the social order is founded, the body is always in view and on view, and, it invites a gaze, a gaze of difference -- the most historically constant one being the gendered gaze. There is a sense in which constructs such as the "social body" or the "body politic" are not just metaphors but can be read literally. It is not surprising then that when the body politic needed to be purified in Nazi Germany, certain kinds of bodies had to be eliminated.

### AT: Affect---1NC

#### Affect isn’t a basis for politics---they provide no recourse for dealing with atrocities.

Sherwin 15—New York Law School [Richard, “Too Late for Thinking: The Curious Quest for Emancipatory Potential in Meaningless Affect and Some Jurisprudential Implications,” Law, Culture and the Humanities, 13 Oct 2015, p. 1-13]

In the history of western culture we can point to three historic moments of epistemological de-centering. The Copernican revolution taught humanity that we do not dwell at the center of the universe. The Freudian revolution taught us that the ‘‘I’’ is a lonely island besieged on all sides by a raging sea of irrational, unconscious forces. Then quantum theory taught us that the universe is indeterminate: subject to uncanny chance operations. Affect theory, perhaps as an extension of the Darwinian evolutionary account of selective adaptation, humbles rationalist pretensions further by subordinating mind to material, bio-chemical processes. If thinking is always an after-thought, an after-the-fact construction, then we can never reliably account for how we’ve actually been affected by things and others in the world around us. How oppressive never to escape the grip of contingent social constructs. How depressing, if endless deconstruction yields only more fragmentation. Surely something must abide, some Higgs Boson-like elementary particle that can withstand deconstruction’s powerful blows. Is there anything real enough to withstand critique? Is there any basis left to hope for emancipation from the destabilizing mutability of human fabrication? In Brian Massumi’s view, there is. As he puts it: “The world always already offers degrees of freedom ready for amplification.”22 This takes us to the heart of the vitalist/ liberation impulse, namely: “escape from crystallized power structures.”23 In Massumi’s writings, affect operates as a cipher – a black box into which he can pack his emancipatory ideal.24 (“‘Affect’ is the word I use for ‘hope.’”25) What Massumi does not and perhaps cannot, or simply does not care to do is formulate a coherent basis for political judgment. While he at some points expresses a preference for “caring” and “belonging,”26 he offers no basis in affect theory for why those forms of behavior are preferable to other perhaps more intense alternatives, such as “anger” and “shock,” which he also embraces.27 But choices must be made. As Martha Nussbaum has noted, a society that cultivates conditions of anger and disgust, for example, is different from one that promotes empathy, dignity, and love.28 Massumi is enamored of the anti-structural,29 the spontaneous emergent process that Deleuze called “pure immanence.” But with affective intensity as his ultimate value30 Massumi remains trapped in a double bind. No critical judgment is forthcoming so long as intensity may be amplified.31 Because of this Massumi cannot coherently critique manifestly oppressive political structures (such as futurism, Nazism, and other intensity-fueled political regimes). How could he if the masses have opted to embrace such regimes for the intensity they provide? Massumi’s resistance to making judgments is consistent with his theory, which minimizes to the vanishing point the human capacity for choice. For Massumi, the very notions of ‘‘individual will’’ and ‘‘subjective reflection’’ are a fiction. (“There is no individual outside its own trans-individual becoming.”32) Body is always conditioning mind – presumably without our conscious awareness. In the end, “events decide.”33 What could human freedom mean under such conditions? The upshot is plain: in Massumi’s politics of affect, human freedom loses its capacity to signify. Choices are a fiction, and in any event no apparent normative basis exists for affirming, much less institutionalizing a preferred set of power structures. Affective intensity lacks structure by definition. Indeed, that is its appeal. (“Intensity is a value in itself.”34) But as Anthony Kronman has eloquently argued, without coherent structures, the legal, political, and cultural conditions necessary for the meaningful exercise of freedom (including political judgment) are unlikely to emerge – and if they do, they are unlikely to be sustainable.35 The latter point is borne out by the very political events that Massumi identifies as exemplary of his theory. If the “Arab Spring” and the “Occupy Movement”36 illustrate anything it is the effervescence of political action based on spontaneous intensity. In the absence of adequate political structures, this kind of political action is destined to pass with the next day’s tide. The emancipatory cri du coeur that can be heard echoing in the work of cultural theorists like Massumi may have landed on “trans-individual” affect as the intensive Higgs Boson wave-particle of political science. Its indeconstructability promises freedom from subjective and cultural contingency – the prison house of “crystallized power structures.” But there is a price to be paid. The radical devaluation of reflective consciousness produces a species of freedom that signifies nothing. Perhaps this is what it is like to embrace a Zeitgeist of “de-humanism.”37 In Massumi’s politics of affect we can discern the impetus for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ ideology. As Ben Anderson writes: “There is always already an excess [affect] that power must work to recuperate but is destined and doomed to miss. It is that excess that is central to the creativity of bio-political production and thus the power of naked life.”38 Affect in this sense is “a movement of creative production” that always eludes capture. And this is what conveys a sense of its emancipatory power.39 The intensity of affect liberates us from bondage to contingent cultural entanglement. Corporeal ontology precedes cultural epistemology. This move away from the centrality of cognition marks the demise not only of identity politics, but of identity itself, perhaps even of psychology.40 Simply stated, affect theorists like Massumi romanticize the unknowable “fluid materiality of excitable networks” as a way of disrupting familiar social and cultural hierarchies.41 In so doing, they elevate raw process over social and cultural regimentation and subjugation. It is the neurobiological equivalent of Rousseau’s primitive origin of society, an updated version of the Romantics’ myth of enchantment. If only questions about freedom and responsibility for shared values, justice included, could be resolved by so simple an expedient as the vitalist/liberation category shift from human agency to ‘‘trans-individual affective process.’’ Much can be learned about the various forms of political violence that affective intensity has assumed over the course of human history. But one needn’t take the historical path to discern trouble for Massumi’s emancipatory project. One can start with neuroscience itself.42 Theorists like Massumi play down (as they must) a variety of obstacles that stand in the way of affective emancipation: from the constraints of evolution to the biological programming of the amygdala itself.43 Indeed, what constitutes ‘‘fearfulness,’’ for example, depends upon programming the amygdala based on a habituated pattern of external stimuli.44 There are other problems as well. For instance, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the question of how communication occurs among different levels of the mind/body complex. As Steve Pile writes, for theorists like Massumi “affect is defined in opposition to cognition, reflexivity, consciousness and humanness.”45 Feelings, on the other hand, occupy a space between non-cognitive affect and highly socialized emotions. Feelings in this sense are pre-cognitive (“a response to transpersonal affects”).46 Our response to affects personalizes them. Through feelings we associate affects with the subject who experiences them. For their part, emotions reflect a shift from pre-cognitive subjectivity to the cognitive domain of socially constructed experience.47 Emotions, in this sense, are how I interpret what I’m feeling through language and other representational or cultural symbolic practices. Affect theorists like Massumi insist that my choices and perhaps even my feelings may turn out to have nothing to do with the affect my body has already processed without my knowing it. This view preserves the purity of affective intensity by keeping it free of subjective or social significance. If you are in the ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ camp of affect theory along with Massumi, affect can never be symbolized, which means it can never be cognized. Affect, in this view, is always beyond consciousness. It’s like the dark matter that makes up the universe: we know it’s there, we just can’t say anything about it. The problem for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ theorists like Massumi is that they want to eat their cake and have it too. Affects for them are ciphers – free-ranging radicals incapable of signifying. Yet, at the same time, many of these same theorists engage in searing critiques of those “in power” who use mass media along with other instrumentalities of affective manipulation for purposes of enhancing social or political control.48 The difficulty is this: If affect is being actively engineered to manipulate people’s behavior – whether in the form of habits of consumption, political judgments, or jury verdicts – it is incumbent upon the theorists to account for how exactly this manipulation is being carried out. As Pile cogently notes, how are the agents of affective manipulation able to “know the unknowable” sufficiently well to control their course and impact in society?49 Thrift’s recourse to metaphors such as “pipes and cables” is hardly sufficient to bear the burden of scientific explanation. Indeed, the nomenclature that has emerged to account for the engineering of affect – ranging from “affect flow between bodies,” “transmissions,” and “contagion”50 – all seem to suffer from the same fundamental lack of explanatory power. If we cannot know what affects are, it stands to reason that we cannot know how to control their flow and impact in society.

### AT: Poetry---1NC

#### Poetry doesn’t spur social change or ameliorate social conditions---it actually trades off with real-world political solutions.

Wolff 10 (Rebecca, MFA @ Iowa, poet, fiction writer, and the editor and creator of both Fence Magazine and Fence Books, 7/28, "GLUTEN: ESSAY WITH REDUNDANCIES, EMBEDDED OPEN LETTER TO JULIANA SPAHR, DISCLAIMERS, AND PSYCHO-POLITICAL UNRAVELING," http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WwI3QseZcH8J:www.fenceportal.org/%3Fpage\_id%3D1008+&cd=9&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

I admire, and sometimes look up to, those who work with and experiment with the dynamics of the group, and who can see their way clear to define a group for themselves. You invoke the largest of groups when you state that your mandate for poetry is that it respond to “shared social struggle”—you imply a vast yet identifiable group whose struggles you demand and challenge poetry to address, to respond to. Everything’s fine, with what you say, with me, until we get to this clause: “…and that any poetry which subtracts itself from such engagements is no longer of interest.” “To us” being the clearly implied end of the sentence. I find myself, since I am writing directly to you, wondering: Who died and acknowledged you the legislator of that which is of interest? Why are you putting yourself in the position of eliminating/intimidating, with your implied author- ity, anyone who does not agree with your position? Certainly it is a didactic move, and I understand that there are powerful, timely arguments for didacticism, but it is also a dictatorial one, and this just doesn’t seem very you, nor very “shared.” While my strongest objection is to the gesture itself, here I will additionally try to out- line my disagreement with the ballast of your assertion, with the ball you are throwing. And I’ll throw in a disclaimer: My disagreement doesn’t really originate or reside in my own poetry, though of course yours is a planet-sized call-out to anyone who invokes the personal in her poetry. I don’t have these kinds of qualms about the poetry that I write. Sometimes it’s kind of social, when that’s what I’m thinking about. Sometimes it’s about my mom, who also is a person in the world so referencing “mom” could be construed as social. “Referencing,” as words do, can be social. The I is a metaphor for others, when it’s working right. Narratives are one way that wisdom is transmitted; plus they’re an awesome trick. So while I admire your super-strong drive for some kind of unified, community-based, activated practice for your own writing and for the writing of those you want to be surrounded by, for reasons having to do with my free-school, egalitarian upbringing, I really can’t stand anyone telling anyone how it is okay to write poetry. The move is especially egregious in this situation in which it is being posited that there is something really important at stake, such as social change or social improvement or social progress or social anything, however modestly it is asserted that you don’t really know what it is that you are calling “social poetics.” You take a “means justified by ends” approach here, and while it is impossible for me or anyone to prove that a social poetics is not demonstrably effective ENOUGH to justify ultimatistic rule, it is also impossible for you or anyone to prove that it is. I like (and by like I mean hate) this idea of a sort of concretism or absolutism that is warranted or merited by circumstance, and thereby am adopting same for my oppositional platform, which asserts that the following is the case: Poetry and poems are not socio-politically effective, and therefore claims made on sociopolitical grounds for the relative “interest” or merit of various terms or subject matter or areas of interest for poems and poetry are specious. My assertion is that currently, and concretely, poetry, or poetics, in whatever practical forms and constructed contexts it takes place has actually a negatively measurable effect or impact on real-world conditions of social struggle. As far as I understand it this is what George Oppen thought, and he made the critical mistake of thinking that he commensurately had to STOP WRITING POETRY and just do socio- political actions. I’m not saying this is what ought to be done, or that poets ought NOT engage the social in their poems, their thinking about poetry, and their reading of poetry. Far from it! My other assertion is that, in the both/and kind of way, poets ought to just go ahead and engage like crazy with the social, IF THEY FEEL LIKE IT (feelings being related to sociopolitical conditions), and engage students/correspondents in thinking about this poetry, and engage publishers in projects that help to distribute it, or just post it on their blogs, or what have you. And I would hope that your Skool has at heart a dream for stirring up some kind of thousands-strong “army” or shall I say industrial-strength, family-sized kind of Activated Coterie of rigorously engaged young people who are going to collectively summon up some material activity, some action that is not self-erasing by virtue of its context. When I say art has been ineffectual/ineffective I don’t mean by any means to suggest an inevitability, but rather an unfortunate eventuality, or current outcome. So on an adjusted scale of political efficacy I’d say writing a socially engaged poem is a negative, while buying ecologically sound dish soap is a .5, and writing a letter to your congressperson is a 1.5 or greater, depending on the congressperson and what county you live in. Dish soap consumption? No, dish soap production. Why don’t I stay outside the rubric or trope of industrial manufactur- ing? Because it would be disingenuous to do so. I understand, I like to think, though I do not partake in it, how great it must feel to feel like you are part of a great society of poets who are forging ahead, joining hands, making space for new ideas, getting really deep into some ideas. But I ask again: What is the place in this great society for totally rude, cool-kid behavior like that above? When you seem to be convinced that a great deal is at stake in the behavior of poetry, its comportment, its deportment. One very practical, material danger of your statement—it is a bold assertion, and really a much shorter version of this letter might simply ask that you instate the “to us,” for maximumclarity of group intentionality—is that there will be decades, now, thousands, multitudes yet to be born, of young poets, especially in California but certainly all over, who will shake in their boots to think that they might fall short or run afoul of the Skool’s requirements, without knowing it, no matter how hard they try, oh lord, it’s their worst nightmare. And if I am still an editor I will be required to plow through their sad output, their earnest attempts to please you. It makes me long for decadence. In poetry. I do agree that it’s good when poems are perceivably awake to shared reality. As mentioned above, the jury is out, probably forever, on whether this awakeness is ameliorative of bad social conditions. I do not mean to say that this awakeness is a bad motive or context for a poem, but rather that it is nightmarishly bad for charismatic leaders to suggest the hallucinogenically charismatic notion that because of the awesome burden on poems, ultimatistic gestures by poetry “actors,” if you will, are justifiable.

### AT: Moten and Harney

#### Their strategy peters out at best and gets coopted at worst

Webb 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997). Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision. There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

### AT: Puig

#### Pragmatic consequentialism is prerequisite to queer flourishing---the framework their links assume is a paranoid reading that interrupts queer becoming.

Adam **Greteman 18**. Department of Art Education, School of the Art Institute of Chicago. “On Reading Practices: Where Pragmatism and Queer Meet,” Sexualities and Genders in Education pp 37-65, Springer.

I want to attend to the reading practices that inform my own work here to be transparent to my readers, but also provide lessons on the different ways in which “theory” informs reading as a practice. I first came to think about reading practices through pragmatism—not queer theory. For some this might seem rather unqueer. There has been little written looking at the ways in which pragmatism and queer theory could be productive together, although I’ve tried (Greteman & Wojcikiewicz, 2014). Nor have pragmatists in general taken up a queer project, despite pragmatism being a little queer. That’s neither here nor there. What is of interest to me in this chapter are reading practices. As Cleo Cherryholmes (1999) illustrated, reading is more than meets the eye. Pragmatism itself is, as well, more than meets the eye. Pragmatism presents a particular form of reading that attends to action. I dwell on pragmatism here to reveal my own pragmatic leanings. I like pragmatism. I also tend to read things I like as I sense, as argued elsewhere, there are pedagogies and politics tied to liking (Greteman & Burke, 2017). Cherryholmes (1999) began Reading Pragmatism, noting that the reason to engage pragmatism was “that pragmatism looks to the consequences that we endlessly bump up against” (p. 3). And we bump up against consequences all day, every day. Those consequences are the results of things we—ourselves and others—have done as well as things far outside of our control. “Pragmatists conceptualize the world where we, all of us,” Cherryholmes argued, “are constantly thrown forward as the present approaches but never quite reaches the future” (p. 3). It is, in his estimation, “a discourse that attempts to bridge where we are with where we might end up” (p. 3). A key word, of course, being “might,” as pragmatism cannot predict what will come, but attends to contemplating conceivably what might come. We don’t know what will come, but we suspect we will come in some way to a future. Pragmatism is less a theory. Instead, it is a way of doing things in the world attending to the conceivable consequences of our actions. Queers come in the world, and in coming they encounter consequences, and not just theoretically. I sense pragmatism’s attention to consequences is important decades into the existence of various queer theories that have offered readings of various types of objects—films, performances, novels, policies, experiences, and more. Those readings—once scandalous in the academy—have now become part of the academy. They have in infiltrating the institutions they once critiqued or parodied or subverted become practices that can inform work that more, now than ever, has the backing of the institution . And, with such institutionalization we can more, now than ever, contemplate the conceivable consequences of queer theory and its attendant practices. We might now be able to think about if and how queer theories have had and could continue to have consequences for the worlds we inhabit—through discourse, material practices, and more. What are the conceivable consequences of various types of queer readings? What do such readings do for readers as those readers encounter the daily work of living? This is a question I will hopefully provide responses to throughout the remainder of this book as I contemplate how queer theory—as I have read and encountered it—has allowed me to contemplate queer thriving. Reading is—this might seem obvious—contingent and contextual. It is informed by our time, objects we have encountered, relationships we have had, and much more. Our readings are not, nor can they be, ahistorical. They will become dated, outdated even, becoming instead signs of a time gone by. Such times gone by might be read—in the present—as a sign of progress. See, things have gotten better as texts written years ago show things were pretty shitty. However, such times might also be read nostalgically as a time one wished one had lived in. “Wow, the 1970s sound fabulous! What happened to us?” I will, I suspect fall into reading things as signs of progress and nostalgically. I hope you’ll forgive me, but I think progress and nostalgia can serve us in various ways. Theoretical traditions serve us in various ways as well. Different theoretical traditions have offered different ways of reading texts . Cherryholmes (1999) illustrated this by providing readings that take an “authoritative” perspective or are informed by deconstruction, new historicism, and, of course pragmatism. This move was pedagogical, providing readers with a strategy to distinguish between related, but different, reading practices. Reading practices, Cherryholmes illustrated, have different consequences for how a text impacts readers and beyond. In addition, his readings illustrated distinctions between particular critical traditions (under the banner of poststructuralism and postmodernism) and pragmatism . Cherryholmes argued: Poststructural and postmodern investigations tend to be investigatory, interpretive, critical, and analytic. They are not forward-looking. They are oriented to commentary and criticism instead of consequences and action. Poststructuralism and its postmodern relatives do not have a project that looks to action, nor do they seek one. (p. 4) “Pragmatism,” as an alternative, “looks to results” (p. 4) but not just any results. The products of pragmatic readings “are never finished. They are interpreted, reinterpreted, and criticized indefinitely” (p. 4). Continuing, Cherryholmes wrote, “as a result, [pragmatic readings] are continually open to new experiences and problems and opportunities. Pragmatist productions deconstruct, they do indeed. And their deconstruction invites, indeed requires, revision and replacement” (p. 4). Pragmatism and its readings embrace the interpretive, analytic, critical options provided by poststructuralism. They are, I think, more alike than they are different. However, pragmatism moves beyond poststructuralism and postmodernism to contemplate action, to roll with the punches in order to make decisions about how to do things in the world. I have, I sense, quoted rather liberally from Cherryholmes above so let me provide my reading. Poststructural and postmodern theories—in which queer theory would be included—do interesting and important work. They deconstruct, interpret, provoke with their readings. They play with words and read against the grain. The work they do is critical since they seek, in part, to expose injustices. Additionally, their work is interpretive, as they do not propose Truth, but offer truths. They are also primarily backward looking. They look back at texts to expose or reveal in those texts their limitations or how the text deconstructs, or how texts illustrate the formation of things. What such ways of readings fail to do (and every reading does some things well and other things less well) is to look forward to the consequences of what they are doing. Deconstructionists or new historicists have not immediately been interested or concerned with contemplating the possible consequences of their readings, although I suspect they are not unconcerned with consequences; being “critical” would imply a certain interest in consequences. Pragmatism on the other hand is forward looking. It attends to the conceivable consequences of its readings. Reading—with a pragmatic bent—is an exercise in reading into the conceivable future that could be the result of actions. It gathers together, assembles, conceivable consequences of doing this, that, or another thing in the world. And this requires interpretive and imaginative thinking. This generally seems rather wishy-washy. How do we determine conceivable consequences? What types of results are we looking for? And what limits help us “conceive” the conceivable? And how do we make choices about what results and consequences we want to help bring to fruition? These are, as Cherryholmes illustrated, important questions to ask and questions that are answered carefully. We seek results that are fulfilling, we decide inclusively, we expose our ideas to multiple interpretations and criticism so as to deal with the ever-changing realities we encounter. We do, in a sense, the work we often are already doing living in the world, except we do so attentively. Such answers are, to be clear, not “idealistic,” rather: At the beginning and end of the day pragmatists are realists because they value what happens. They are interested in results, in consequences. They understand that pragmatist experiments are social constructions. These constructions come from experience and ideas and knowledge and power. Proposed material/ideal and realistic/idealistic distinctions deconstruct because the material conditions in which we find ourselves contribute to and shape what we can conceptualize and enact. Pragmatists try to bring about beautiful results in the midst of power and oppression and ignorance . (Cherryholmes, 1999, p. 5) Pragmatism accepts the contingent realities that we face in our everyday lives where we have to make choices. And those choices are informed and limited in all kinds of ways. We cannot base our decisions on some foundation or truth. Pragmatism is “anti-foundational” since such foundations and “Truth” are already conditioned and constructed. Rather, pragmatism makes its decisions attending to consequences that are satisfying and fulfilling within the complex milieu where we come to understand those very concepts themselves. It exists in the present, is informed by the past, with an eye toward a beautiful future. Reparative Readings Pragmatism—in looking forward —attends to contemplating pleasure and beauty as desired consequences of our actions. Pragmatism is, I suggest, an approach committed to bringing into existence positive affects and actions. This is something decidedly different from most critical traditions. Most critical traditions, as Eve Sedgwick (2004) aptly argued, embrace a hermeneutics of suspicion and this embrace, by the start of the twenty-first century, had become a problem. Sedgwick was concerned that there was a wide spread habit within critical work to engage a hermeneutics of suspicion. And while such hermeneutics—what she calls “paranoid” reading—is an important reading practice, there is a side effect when such reading practices become habitual. Critical theorists—variously situated in queer, feminist, race-conscious, and related theories—for Sedgwick , “may have made it less rather than more possible to unpack the local, contingent relations between any given piece of knowledge and its narrative/epistemological entailments for the seeker, knower, or teller” (p. 124). Paranoid reading, while excellent at exposing things may, in becoming a “mandatory injunction rather than a possibility among other possibilities,” limit encountering, intervening, and creating other possibilities. Or put differently, if we are mandated to do particular types of readings to be considered critical, we become limited in the work that we can do. We find ourselves always looking over our shoulder, paranoid about what enemies are chasing us without looking ahead to things that could trip us up (a paranoid option) or provide us support against our enemies. Reading practices, I hope you see, are never neutral, but always bring with them assumptions and viewpoints about what counts and what does not count. Reading practices inform what we look at, how we look, and where we look. They inform why we look at all. Reading practices frame the world before us and, just as a “frame” does, it sets us up to see (or be seen) in particular ways. Frames—like our reading practices—limn the scene for better and for worse. There are always frames, one task is to begin to see different frames and what they do for the objects they capture within the borders and what they, then, by definition, exclude. Sedgwick illustrated that queer reading practices, by and large, took up a paranoid position, which made sense. Within the history of sexuality, she argued, there was a clear relationship between homosexuality and paranoia. Homosexuality, as theorized by Freud, was connected to paranoia and anti-homophobic inquiries in a similar vein took up the paranoid position, in an attempt to expose the violence of, for instance, heteronormativity (Warner, 1991) or homonormativity (Duggan, 2002) or homonationalism (Puar, 2007). The paranoid position was critical to resistance as it assisted in recognizing and exposing the enemies to queer lives and practices not only at the interpersonal level, but at the cultural, institutional, and disciplinary levels.1 However, as Sedgwick aptly noted, “just because you have enemies doesn’t mean you have to be paranoid” (p. 127). “Indeed,” Sedgwick continued, “for someone to have an unmystified view of systemic oppression does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences” (p. 127). Recognizing the realities of oppressions—in their diversity—does not require that one engage in a particular type of critical project. In fact, limiting oneself to a particular type of project would eliminate the possibility of surprise. Instead, it would leave readers over time with the sense that they are being beat over the head with a bat of the same information. “There’s oppression. Do you see the oppression? Do you see the oppression? It is there, there is the oppression. Do you see it?” This type of exposure is, as Sedgwick noted, a central tenet of paranoid reading practices. However, as she noted “[paranoid strategies] represent a way, among other ways, of seeking, finding, and organizing knowledge” (p. 130). And to be clear, there are important things that paranoid strategies do. Pointing out and exposing oppression is important. However, there are also important things that such strategies fail to adequately address; this being a lesson the tunnel of oppression I addressed in the preface taught me early on. The tunnel of oppression was rooted in exposing, but the moment it sought to promote, to assemble objects that did different work, its work became contested. As an alternative to paranoid reading, but not as a replacement, Sedgwick developed what she called reparative reading, arguing that “to read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror, however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the reader as new” (p. 146). To read from a reparative position is to allow for the possibility of surprise and leave open space that things could be different. This is “because the reader has room to realize that the future may be different from the present” (p. 146). Additionally, she continued, “it is also possible for her to entertain such profoundly relieving, ethically critical possibilities as that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did” (p. 146). Reparative reading practices—embracing the contingent and positive—similarly to pragmatism, are concerned with how things could be different. There is with Sedgwick’s reparative readings, like Cherryholmes’s pragmatism, an opening for work looking forward done under the banner of queer theory. Queers do not have to maintain and be determined by their historical connection to paranoid positions, but can invent additional ways of positioning themselves in and against the world. Such a move makes sense as it recognizes the changing realities and needs of queers.

# 2NC---T USFG

#### No cards.

# 2NC---Case

### 2NC---Case

#### Ballot isn’t a currency, you are neither changing the state nor the state of debate – debates are insulated, makes judges the authorities to decide the validity of struggle and acceptableness of how they commune which’s oppressive and is a double turn with haptics.

Bankey 13 (BRENDON BANKEY – A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Communication August 2013 – Bankey holds an BA from Trinity and now holds an MA from Wake Forest. This thesis was approved by: Michael J. Hyde, Ph.D., Advisor; Mary M. Dalton, Ph.D., Chair; R. Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D. THE “FACT OF BLACKNESS” DOES NOT EXIST: AN EVOCATIVE CRITICISM OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC IN ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE AND ITS (MIS)USE OF FRANTZ FANON’S BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS – From Chapter Two – footnoting Atchison and Panetta and consistent with Bankey’s defense of an aspect of their position – http://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/39020/Bankey\_wfu\_0248M\_10473.pdf)

For Atchison and Panetta , “the ballot” a judge casts at the conclusion of a debate should signify nothing more or less than that person’s decision “to vote for the team that does the best debating.” This understanding encourages judges to limit their analysis of a debate to the arguments presented within each team’ s allotted times to speak. It would exclude decisions focused on resolving external abuses such as: determining the appropriateness of statements or events between a team or program that occurred outside of the immediate debate; challenging a school’s succ ess at “recruiting minority participants”; criticizing the civil rights legacy of participants’ academic institutions; or increasing the presence of underrepresented bodies in elimination debates. By contrast, some non - traditional teams interested in challenging the marginalizing effects of policy debate formats have begun to advocate what I call a “ballot as currency” model for judges to evaluate debates. While the specific terminology is not universally employed, the “ballot as currency” approach establis hes that a judge’s ballot signifies what bodies and practices she deems appropriate for policy debate. Within this model, a non - traditional team’s ability to accumulate wins is a referendum on the perceived acceptableness of their bodies for academic spaces. Beyond the structural factors that limit the visibility of any individual debate, Atchison and Panetta identify two problems with the “ballot as currency” method for evaluating debates. First, the “ballot as currency” approach presents the dilemma of “ asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem ” with very “few participants ” (generally the other people in the room) allowed to take a stake in the process. This places the course of community change on the shoulders of those who judge debates between traditional and non - traditional teams and excludes those “coaches and directors who are not preferred judges and, therefore, do not have access to many debates.” Furthermore, it excludes those “who might want to contribute to community conversation, but are not directly involved in competition.” Prioritizing the “ballot as currency” approach fails to recognize that “debate community is broader than the individual participants” of a given debate and risks the creation of “an insulated community that has a ll the answers” without ever engaging those concerned individuals who do not attend every competition. The result is that a very narrow set of judges, usually those that often judge Framework debates, are granted the authority to determine the outcome of communal change. 21

#### Burden of Rejoinder bad – the nature of debate requires the neg to disagree – even if debate is about methods, not people, they creates a moral hazard where we’re forced to be on the “wrong side” of queer sociality OR weaponize other queer strategies to say Minnesota isn’t doing enough – intensifies psychic violence, zeroes relationality

Subotnik 98 – Professor of Law at Touro College Jacob D. Fuschsberg Law Center (Dan, 7 Cornell J. K. and Pub. Pol’y. 683)

Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly. An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74 "Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive articles. n76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. n77 [\*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny. If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected. In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [\*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

#### Especially true in policy debate

Murillo 14 (Gabe, Panda lover and Former Debate Coach at OU, Innovation and Failure: The Under Appreciated Skills of a Policy Debater. 5/19. <http://meangreenklab.blogspot.com/2014/05/innovation-and-failure-under.html> //shree)

Debate also encourages innovation as a response to failure. In policy debate students must deal with the consequences of failure. In every debate a student either wins or losses and no team has ever been undefeated through their entire careers. Often time students only have a matter of minutes in between losing one debate and having to start another. Learning to take a loss, and learning from that loss is a unique aspect of policy debate, this process leads to the creativity necessary for innovation. Students must learn to dwell in this failure and according to Judith Halberstam that is in and of itself productive, "Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world... Perhaps most obviously, failure allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods. Failure preserves some of the wondrous anarchy of childhood and disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between adults and children, winners and losers." (Halberstam, 2-3)

# 1NR---R1---Fullertown

## Cap K

### 2NC--OV

#### Cap turns case – precapitalist societies accepted gender and sexual fluidity – [-ism] is a bourgeois ideology to divide working class people thru the sexual order of the cis-het middle class

Wolf 9 – Associate editor of the International Socialist Review, on the executive committee of the National Equality March, and writer for the Nation, MRZine, Counterpunch, Dissident Voice, and Socialist Worker [Sherry, *Sexuality and Socialism: History, Politics, and Theory of LGBT Liberation*, Haymarket Books, pp. 19-24]

The oppression of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people hasn’t always existed, and neither have LGBT people as a distinct sector of the population. The oppression of all sexual minorities is one of modern capitalism’s myriad contradictions. Capitalism creates the material conditions for men and women to lead autonomous sexual lives, yet it simultaneously seeks to impose heterosexual norms on society to secure the maintenance of the economic social and sexual order. ¶ Famous lesbians such as Melissa Etheridge pack concert venues and out comedian Ellen DeGeneres hosts an Emmy Award-winning syndicated talk show, while homophobic laws defend discrimination on the job and in marriage. LGBT people such as Matthew Shepard are brutally beaten to death by bigots, while public opinion has radically shifted in favor of LGBT civil rights.1 This apparently contradictory state of affairs in the United States can be explained. ¶ LGBT oppression, like women’s oppression, is tied to the centrality of the nuclear family as one of capitalism’s means to both inculcate gender norms and outsource care for the current and future generations of workers at little cost to the state, as explained in detail below. In addition, the oppression of LGBT people under capitalism, like racism and sexism, serves to divide working-class people from one another, especially in their battles for economic and social justice. While capitalist society attempts to pigeonhole people into certain gender roles and sexual behaviors, socialists reject these limitations. Instead, socialists fight for a world in which sexuality is a purely personal matter, without legal or material restrictions of any sort. The right of self-determination for individuals that socialists uphold must include individuals’ freedom to choose their own sexual behavior, appearance, and erotic preferences. ¶ Sexuality, like many other behaviors, is a fluid – not fixed – phenomenon. Homosexuality exists along a continuum. The modern expression of this can be found among the millions of men and women who identify as LGBT – often identifying themselves differently at different times in their lives. There are not two kinds of people in this world, gay and straight. As far as biologists can tell, there is only one human race with a multiplicity of sexual possibilities that can either be frustrated or liberated, depending on the way human society is organized.¶ Reams of historical evidence confirm that what we define today as homosexual behavior has existed for at least thousands of years, and it is logical to assume that homosexual acts have been occurring for as long as human beings have walked the Earth. But it took the Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century to create the potential for vast numbers of ordinary people to live outside the nuclear family, allowing for modern gay, lesbian, and bisexual identities to be born. Not until the late twentieth century did some gender-variant people begin to identify themselves as transgender, though people who have defined modern Western concepts of gender-appropriate behavior have existed throughout history in many different cultures. The systematic oppression of LGBT people as it is experienced in most contemporary Western societies, therefore, is also a fairly recent phenomenon in human history. This is not to argue, however, that prior to capitalisms humans existed in a sexual paradise free of repression or restrictions of any kind. Rather, legal prohibition and social taboos from antiquity through the precapitalist era existed in many cultures on the basis of sex acts, often denouncing no-procreative sex, without the condemnation or even the conception of sexual identity as an intrinsic or salient aspect of a person’s being. ¶ Contemporary industrial societies created the possibility for men and women to identify themselves and live as gays and lesbians, argues the collection *Hidden from History*. ¶ What we call “homosexuality” (in the sense of the distinguishing traits of “homosexuals”), for example, was not considered a unified set of acts, much less a set of qualities defining particular persons, in precapitalist societies… Heterosexuals and homosexuals are involved in social “roles” and attitudes which pertain to a particular society, modern capitalism.2 ¶ It was capitalism, in fact, that gave rise to modern individuality and the conditions for people to have intimate lives based on personal desire, a historic break from the power of the feudal church and community that once arranged marriages. Under capitalism, a person’s labor is converted into an individually owned commodity that is bought and sold on the market. Individuals are thrust into completion with each other for work, housing, education, etc., and individual citizens of states are counted in a census and register to vote, or, if they have the means, own property. All of these features of capitalist society established individuality in ways unthinkable under earlier systems like feudalism, creating the potential for a flourishing of sexual autonomy as well. As Karl Marx put it, “In this society of free completion, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds, etc., which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate.”3 ¶ Historical evidence suggests that homosexual behavior was successfully integrated in many precapitalist cultures. The most famous example is ancient Greece, where sexual relations between older men and teenage boys were heralded as one of the highest forms of love. These relationships, however, were encouraged between wealthier, older, and powerful “betters” and their subordinates who were younger, poorer, or conquered. For the early Greeks and Romans, status and power between lovers were central to their conception of same-sex relations and they held starkly different views of those who played the penetrative role in sex and those who were penetrated. Plutarch, the Greek-born historian of the first century explained, “We class those who enjoy the passive part as belonging to the lowest depth of vice and allow them not the least degree of confidence or respect of friendship.”4 ¶ Many American Indian tribes embraced transvestite men and women, known as berdaches, who adopted the gender roles of the “opposite” sex and are sometimes referred to today as “two-spirited” people. A multiplicity of sexual and gender arrangements existed from tribe to tribe, according to anthropologists. Some male berdaches had sex exclusively with other men, though not other berdaches, while some remained celibate, had partners of both sexes, or had exclusively heterosexual sex.5 Gender variance, not sexual preference, defined the berdache, and rather than deriding them for thei gender nonconformity, American Indian tribes saw berdaches as valuable members of their society. One Crow elder explains: “We don’t waste people the way white society does. Every person has their gift.”6 ¶ Even the Roman Catholic Church, until the twelfth century, celebrated love between men. When it ended priestly marriage and enforced chastity, homosexuality was prohibited as well.7 However, in these societies, it was homosexual actions that were tolerated, lauded, or pilloried, not an identifiable category of people. Economic and social conditions had not yet developed in ways that allowed for large numbers of people to acknowledge, express, or explore same-sex desire as a central feature of their lives or their identities. ¶ The French philosopher Michel Foucault challenged modern society’s attempts to superimpose its sexual outlook on the ancients. He argues: ¶ The Greeks did not see love for one’s own sex and love for the other sex as opposites, as two exclusive choices, two radically different types of behavior…. Where the Greeks bisexual then? Yes, if we mean by this that a Greek [free man] could, simultaneously or in turn be enamored by a boy or a girl…. But if we wish to turn our attention to the way in which they conceived of this dual practice, we need to take note of the fact that they did not recognize two kinds of “desire”…. Their way of thinking, what made it possible to desire a man or a woman was simply the appetite that nature had implanted in man’s heart for “beautiful” human beings, whatever their sex.8 ¶ Whereas previous class societies prohibited certain sex acts, the rising capitalist state and its defenders in the fields of medicine, law, and academia stepped in to define and control human sexuality in ways previously unimagined. These nineteenth-century professionals – almost entirely white men – reflected the interests and prejudices of the rising middle class. With economic growth and development the need for higher levels of education for more kinds of jobs, which extended adolescence and removed teenagers from many occupations, thus reducing social interaction between unrelated adults and children. Medical professionals aiming to legitimize their field pathologized masturbation, while legislators encouraged age-of-consent laws and pressed for higher minimum ages for marriage. Homosexual relations between adults and “innocent minors” were outlawed and juveniles were rendered asexual.9 No less a figure than Sigmund Freud, the father of modern psychiatry at the turn of the twentieth century, theorized and popularized the “problem of homosexuality” while transforming heterosexuality into “the norm we all know without ever thinking much about it.”10

#### State Denialism link turns case – reinscribes public/private distinction which solidify the free market while reproducing gender binaries

McCluskey 8 – Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar at SUNY Buffalo Law (Martha, “How Queer Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy,” in Feminist and Legal Queer Theory: Intinimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations edited by Martha Fineman, Jack Jackson, and Adam Romero, p131-133, accessed 2-4-15 //Bosley)

Queer theory's anti-moralism works together with its anti-statism to advance not simply "politics," but a specific vision of good "politics" seemingly defined in opposition to progressive law and morality. This anti-statist focus distinguishes queer theory from other critical legal theories that bring questions of power to bear on moral ideals of justice. Kendall Thomas (2002), for example, articulates a critical political model that sees justice as a problem of "power, antagonism, and interest," (p. 86) involving questions of how to constitute and support individuals as citizens with interests and actions that count as alternative visions of the public. Thomas contrasts this political model of justice with a moral justice aimed at discovering principles of fairness or institutional processes based in rational consensus and on personal feelings of respect and dignity. Rather than evaluating the moral costs and benefits of a particular policy by analyzing its impact in terms of harm or pleasure, Thomas suggests that a political vision of justice would focus on analyzing how policies produce and enhance the collective power of particular "publics" and "counterpublics" (pp. 91—5). From this political perspective of justice, neoliberal economic ideology is distinctly moral, even though it appears to be anti-moralist and to reduce moral principles to competition between self-interested power. Free-market economics rejects a political vision of justice, in this sense, in part because of its expressed anti-statism: it turns contested normative questions of public power into objective rational calculations of private individual sensibilities. Queer theory's similar tendency to romanticize power as the pursuit of individualistic pleasure free from public control risks disengaging from and disdaining the collective efforts to build and advance normative visions of the state that arguably define effective politics. Brown and Halley (2002), for instance, cite the Montgomery bus boycott as a classic example of the left's problematic march into legalistic and moralistic identity politics. In contrast, Thomas (2002) analyzes the Montgomery bus boycott as a positive example of a political effort to constitute a black civic public, even though the boycott campaign relied on moral language to advance its cause, because it also emphasized and challenged normative ideas of citizenship (p. 100, note 14). By glorifying rather than deconstructing the neoliberal dichotomy between public and private, between individual interest and group identity, and between demands for power and demands for protection, queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism plays into a right-wing double bind. In the current conservative political context, the left appears weak both because its efforts to use state power get constructed as excessively moralistic (the feminist thought police, or the naively paternalistic welfare state) and also because its efforts to resist state power get constructed as excessively relativist (promoting elitism and materialism instead of family values and community well-being). The right, on the other hand, has it both ways, asserting its moralism as inherent private authority transcending human subjectivity (as efficient market forces, the sacred family, or divine will) and defending its cultivation of self-interested power as the ideally virtuous state and market (bringing freedom, democracy, equality to the world by exercising economic and military authoritarianism). From Egalitarian Politics to Renewed Conservative Identity Queer theory's anti-statism and anti-moralism risks not only reinforcing right-wing ideology, but also infusing that ideology with energy from renewed identity politics. Susan Fraiman (2003) analyzes how queer theory (along with other prominent developments in left academics and culture) tends to construct left resistance as a radical individualism modeled on the male "teen rebel, defined above all by his strenuous alienation from the maternal" (p. xii). Fraiman observes that this left vision relies on "a posture of flamboyant unconventionality [that] coexists with highly conventional views of gender [and] is, indeed, articulated through them" (p. xiii). Fraiman links recent left contempt for feminism to a romantic vision of "coolness ... epitomized by the modem adolescent boy in his anxious, self-conscious and theatricalized will to separate from the mother" who is by definition uncool—controlling, moralistic, sentimental and not sexy. (p. xii). Even though queer theory distinguishes itself from feminism by repudiating dualistic ideas of gender, its anti-foundationalism covertly promotes an essentialist "binary that puts femininity, reproduction, and normativity on the one hand, and masculinity, sexuality, and queer resistance on the other" (p. 147). This binary permeates queer theory's condemnation of "governance feminism." (Brown and Halley, 2002; Wiegman, 2004) a vague category mobilizing images of the frumpy, overbearing, unexciting, unfunny, and not-so-smart "schoolmarm" (Halley, 2002) whose authority will naturally be undermined when real "men" appear on the scene. Suggesting the importance of gender conventions to the term's power, similar phrases do not seem to have gained comparable academic currency as a way to deride the complex regulatory impact of other specific uses of state authority -for instance postmodernists do not seem to widely denounce "governance anti-racism," "governance socialism," "governance populism," "governance environmentalism" or "governance masculinism" (though Brown and Halley do criticize progressive law reform more generally with the term "governance legalism" (p. 11)).

#### Line-by-Line.Cap turns communities of [care/endurance/etc] – reduces [method] into a commodity thru alienation – the 1AC will have a voice but lose its soul as it’s reincorporated as a new item on the market

Robinson 14 – Professor of sociology at UC Santa Barbara [William, *Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity*, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 222-4]

How viable are transformative strategies based on the notion that local communities can withdraw from global capitalism? The attempt to create alter- native communities at the local level, to set up cooperatives, to decentralize circuits of food supply, to withdraw from the global agro-industrial regime, to decentralize energy distribution and consumption, and to construct cooperative enterprises and local solidarity economies are necessary and important. Yet they do not in themselves resolve the problem of power. In the absence of a strategy to confront the state and to transform the system from within we are left with the dangerous illusion that the world can be changed without resolving this matter of power. Global capitalism is now internal to practically all communities on the planet. It has spun webs of worldwide interdependency that link us all to a larger totality. Global capitalism is indeed totalizing. The notion that one can escape from global capitalism not by defeating it but by creating alternative spaces or islands of utopia ignores the unpleasant fact that no matter how one wills it to be so, these spaces cannot disengage from capitalism, if for no other reason than that capital and the state will penetrate – often forcibly – and continuously reincorporate these spaces.

Localized solutions are too piecemeal to confront the power of global capitalism – to change the global balance of class and social forces. There is no way to get around the fact that the TCC holds class power over humanity, and the TNS exercises multiple forms of direct, coercive power. The state exercises power over us. This fact will not go away by ignoring this power. It is illusory to suppose that it can be countered by constructing autonomous communities, which in fact are not autonomous because such communities cannot extricate themselves from the webs of global capitalism, and even if they could, in theory, the state would not allow them to; it would use the force of its law to reincorporate such communities. There is no getting around confrontation with the state, no avoiding a struggle to wrest state power away from capital, its agents and allies. The struggle to withdraw from global capitalism, no matter how important, must be coupled with a struggle to overthrow global capitalism, to destroy the transnational capitalist state.

### AT: Exclusion

#### Access Claims are a new link – it’s historically disproven by Marxists in black America, Africa, Asia, and South America like the Mississippi Freedom Movement spearheaded by Fannie Lou, or sex worker unions at Stonewall demanding material fixes by raced, gender nonconforming, disabled activsts – they’re a neoliberal ruse to portray the local as inescapable to mystify the extra-local relations that structure inequality

Carpenter 15 – Lecturer in Equity Studies and Adult Education & Community Development programs at the University of Toronto (Sara, “The ‘local’ fetish as reproductive praxis in democratic learning,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 36(1):133-143, accessed 2-6-15 //Bosley)

Commodity fetishism becomes represented in consciousness when we look at the price of a commodity and do not recognize the processes that create value and their relation to socially necessary labor time. Furthermore, as Marx demonstrated in Capital, this concealment is a necessary outcome of the contradictions within the social relations of production of capitalism. In this way, what is locally, experientially accessible comes to stand in as the reality of something whose production is organized trans-locally. This disjuncture between what is immediately and locally available and its trans-local organization is the fissure that I want to explore through the use of the concept of fetish. Often the concept of fetishism is interpreted in a paradoxically fetishized way, meaning that we believe the commodity itself to be the source of this mode of consciousness rather than the social relations and forms of consciousness that produce the commodity. Allman (2007) argued that fetishism within Marx's conceptual universe is the ultimate form of reification, ‘a form of distortion where the attributes and powers, the essence, of the person or social relation appear as natural, intrinsic, attributes of powers of the “thing”’ (p. 37). By utilizing the concept of fetish, we can see that within the ‘local trap’, the local becomes a place represented through various domains of space, time, and identity; it becomes objectified or ‘fixed’ in our thinking rather than remaining as processes and relations that shift in time and space. This construction of the local not only sees the ‘extra-local’ as inaccessible, it conceives of the local as inescapable. The local somehow becomes apart from and opposite to the extra-local and the only domain upon which social change may be pursued.

Allman (2001) argued that this construction is intimately tied to the organization of political and economic life under capitalism as separate spheres. Certainly, we can tease out the relationships between this ‘local’ sphere of participation and its manifestation in the conservative communitarian ideology that has characterized articulations of the ‘Third Way’. By fetishizing the local we erase, diminish, misinterpret, and/or confound its relation to the extra-local. The most important point in which this relation is rendered invisible occurs when we do not acknowledge that local relations are not only organized at the local level. The local is not just the local; it is also the global. It is the site where global relations become enacted in specific ways, organized through local social relations (Ng & Mirchandani, 2008). This relation, however, has to be understood as a historical materialist dialectic in order to transcend notions such as ‘glocalization’, which invents the global–local dialectic as product of late capitalism and not, as Allman argued, as part of the inner relations of capitalism (Allman, 2001; Arnove, Torres, & Franz, 2013; Bauman, 1998). In this articulation, the local is not solely determined by the global, read as ‘the base’, but rather is ‘fighting’ for its sovereignty within the expanding global market (Jarvis, 2006). Here the local and the global are conceptualized as separate spheres acting upon one another. Like boxers in the ring, they engage, but return to their separate corners. This connection of the local–global/particular–universal relation obscures some very important pieces of the puzzle, which are fundamental to the radical theorization of democratic learning.

### 1NR Perm

#### 3 – Pedagogy of Insurrection Link – haptics is bourgeois ideology that psychologizes violence born of material conditions – incompatible from the praxis of base building

McLaren and Jandric 20 [Peter McLaren, Peter McLaren is a Canadian scholar who serves as Distinguished Professor in Critical Studies, College of Educational Studies, Chapman University, where he is Co-Director of the Paulo Freire Democratic Project and International Ambassador for Global Ethics and Social Justice, Petar Jandric, Petar Jandrić (PhD) is a Professor at the University of Applied Sciences in Zagreb (Croatia), Visiting Professor at the University of Wolverhampton (UK), and Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Zagreb (Croatia). His research interests are focused to the intersections between critical pedagogy and information and communication technologies, “Postdigital Dialogues: On Critical Pedagogy, Liberation Theology and Information Technology,” 2020, Bloomsbury Academic]

My own take is quite similar to Sanders’ in many respects, however, as I do feel what makes us human through our social interactions—creating a “haptic” sense of life—is slowly dying. Sanders links the rise of humanity’s disembodiment to the industrial revolution, and he draws our attention, for instance, to the technology-enabled slaughter of the American Civil War and World War I. Sanders makes the claim that modernity and the enlightenment confronted the disappearance of human beings and their commodification. Postmodernity only produced a more tragic state. What began to connect us—the telephone, the telegraph, fax machines, and the Internet—can now be seen in hindsight as the formation of a world, where we became more connected but in ways that actually produced more isolation from our humanity—something Sherry Turkle has noted in her book Alone Together (2012). As we fall prey to the all-pervasive influence of corporations and their attempts to re-create us into a desiring machine (desiring what the corporations have to sell us), we have become a less mindful, less vigilant citizenry, watching passively as civil life becomes swallowed up by the logic of capital, consumption, and corporatism. People no longer seem to want to become actors—they want to become celebrities.

PJ: And “influencers”—whatever that means.

PM: Our rhizomatic culture has become corralled by capital, so that it appears as if we are autonomous and in a constant state of self-actualization, but in reality we are making ourselves more vulnerable to the crippling control of Big Brother. Of course, it is easy to sink into a dystopian malaise and to be so fearful of the future that we end up in the thrall of paralysis. For me, technologies are not something to be feared for the electric age has brought us wonderful treasures. The problem is how they have been harnessed by capital, and how we have been harnessed along with them, how we have been capitalized, how we have become capital, and how these technologies have helped in that process. For some, however, technology is a direct instrument of demonic forces!

Let’s hear from a Catholic priest, Father Kevin Cusick of the Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., who claimed on Twitter that God supports his ban on women’s bare shoulders. He wants women to cover their shoulders to protect men’s purity. He was attacked on Twitter, and his response was to compare his struggle to that of Jesus on the cross. He also went on an anti-LGBTQ harangue. Here is Father Cusick’s opinion of Twitter:

Twitter has a dark, demonic side, raging against God and the Church . . .

That brood of vipers and braying, bloodthirsty hounds lurking in readiness was visited upon me with nearly unrelenting fury and incredible magnitude last week.

. . . Wave after wave of calumnious, blasphemous, and obscene memes, gifs, and messages were posted with comments, likes, and retweets ranging up to the tens of thousands. Those who styled themselves my enemies crowed with pleasure that I had been “ratioed”—when negative comments outnumber likes and retweets. Many called for me to delete my account when they weren’t wishing a more horrible fate upon me. Blue check mark accounts with nearly 200k followers piled on. (Badash 2019)

Father Cusick’s solution was to delete his Twitter account. But now we know that demons command the stone-cold hearts of Twitter users. Thank you for alerting us, Father.

PJ: So we have extreme observations from clearly crazed religious autocrats, Peter, but let’s return to some sobriety. What about real problems pertaining to technology, such as automation of work and potential technological unemployment?

PM: Your recent book Education and Technological Unemployment (Peters, Jandrić, and Means 2019) speaks about the rise of the robot work force. Authors in the book mention how so-called experts maintain the view that technology has made human beings more productive—that is, making office workers more productive through word processing, or making surgeons more productive through robotics in the operating room; and the argument is always that new jobs unheard of today will be made possible by the technology of tomorrow. Other experts are not so sure. Your book highlights how machines today are beginning to be able to learn rather than follow instructions— for instance, some of them are now able to respond to human language and movement. We have self-driving vehicles that could eventually put truck drivers and taxi drivers out of work. Sales agents and pilots will decline as flying is more automated and as software does most of the flying and placing search ads. Telemarketers are also at risk. Even physical therapists are at risk by machines that recognize and correct a person’s movements. Machines are learning children’s expressions and estimating their pain levels. The Thai government has a robot that tastes Thai food and estimates whether it tastes sufficiently “authentic.” The computer system called Watson advises military veterans on where to live and which insurance to buy. It also creates new recipes for chefs. A third of a panel of leading economists admitted that technology is centrally implicated in the stagnation of median wages. And all of this weak wage growth is occurring amidst surging corporate profits. The US government continually weakens what few safeguards there are left to help regulate the market and prevent the kind of savage inequality we are experiencing from getting exponentially worse. Are we entering the age of Blade Runner, among perhaps the most famous of the dystopian films? I think that is the trajectory we are on. How far we will go depends upon the nature, purpose, and function of the social movements we create to intervene into and replace transnational capitalism with a socialist alternative.

PJ: What is the role of critical pedagogy in these processes?

PM: The idea always is to make the political more pedagogical and the pedagogical more political. It has, I believe, a number of important implications, Petar, for critical pedagogy. As I have written elsewhere, capitalism as a discourse is self-validating and self-perpetuating and as a social relation works as a self-fueling engine whose capacity to travel around the globe and devour everything in its path is expanding exponentially. As a discourse and social practice that in its current neoliberal incarnation shatters collective experience into monadic bits and pieces, bifurcating students’ relationship to their bodies, brutally taxonomizing human behavior into mind and body, into manual and mental labor, capitalism is a colossus that bestrides the world, wreaking havoc. It possesses a terrible power of psychologizing entrenched and dependent hierarchies of power and privilege and reformulating them into homogeneous and private individual experiences. So that 99 percent of the world are made to feel responsible for their plight.

Let me repeat what I have said before on many occasions—even using the same metaphors. To fight this juggernaut of cruelty that would profit from the tears of the poor if it knew how to market them effectively, critical pedagogy flouts the frontier between scholarship and activism and, as such, works to create a counterpublic sphere. We are askew to traditional academia and are not enmortgaged to its status and do not represent the ivory tower. Many of us loathe academia as it stands and are flailing away inside the system trying to make changes. Yes, we work in the academy but are not traditional academics. And yes, we are complicit in its contradictions. Sure, we sometimes use a rarefied language but we want to mediate human needs and social relations in publicly discussable form, so as to create a commonality of purpose, a species of solidarity able to withstand the plutocracies arrayed against us, a transnational social movement of aggressively oppositional power.

However, critical pedagogy is not yet in a position to play a substantial role in the struggle for a socialist future. Not in North America, in my view. At least not yet. We need to find ways of helping teachers to become agents of revolutionary transformation. As I wrote in my book Pedagogy of Insurrection (McLaren 2015b) we need to transition, to pivot, from a pedagogy of insurrection to a pedagogy of revolution. But this is becoming more difficult in an academy that is moving on a path to intellectual oblivion, political complacency, and civic ineptitude. Today academia is becoming more about negotiating prestige than furthering knowledge; about inflicting revenge for insignificant injuries and personal slights; about ratifying the paralysis of theory over the importance—no, the necessity—of praxis; about replacing the historical grasp of theory with impious sloganeering and empty rhetorical formulations; about replacing debate with debacle; about enforcing opinion and flavor-of-the-day ideas over argumentation; about fostering the promotional worth of stardom and the quivering thrall of fandom over the collective worth of the community; about throwing in one’s lot with the board of governors rather than governing in the service of the common good, of the commonweal; about turning critiques of commodity culture into commodity criticism; about encouraging us to long for more than the system permits us to achieve while electrifying the barriers of that same system; about glorifying our serfdom to our ambitions yet enforcing our own dissatisfaction with our achievements; about preaching social justice and laying claim to political authenticity while spending weekends at luxury item outlets and bourgeois health spas; about accepting positions in the hierarchy of power and privilege yet appointing the most corrupt and ruthless members to the top of that hierarchy.

#### 4 – Poetics Link – 1AC Vourloumis’ depiction of haptics as “poetics” operates on a register of individual creation that becomes a cover for economic exploitation at the level of subjectivity

Gräbner and Wood 10 (Cornelia – Lecturer of European Languages and Cultures at Lancester University, and David – Researcher at the Institute for Aesthetic Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, “Poetics of Resistance: Introduction,” Cosmos & History 6(2):2-19, accessed 2-5-15 //Bosley)

The title of this special issue, poetics of Resistance, is also the name of a network of scholars and cultural producers. The network was founded in 2007 with the purpose of developing new analytical approaches for an understanding of the relationship between creativity, culture, and political resistance, in the context of neoliberal globalization, and from a perspective of committed scholarship. The founding members of the network felt that global neoliberal politics had created a situation in which the relationship between these three categories—creativity, the impact of neoliberalism, a committed position—became increasingly difficult to translate into practices of committed research and cultural production. This difficulty seemed to derive from a variety of reasons. one was that the term ‘cultural resistance’ seemed to hold rhetorical rather than analytical or descriptive power. In his introduction to the Cultural Resistance Reader, stephen Duncombe unravels some of the diverse meanings that the term can take on. he suggests that we think of cultural resistance in terms of ‘scales of resistance’, which he equates with ‘political engagement’. Duncombe suggests the existence of three scale measures: political self-consciousness, the social unit engaged in cultural resistance, and the results of cultural resistance.2 While Duncombe’s model of scales can be a productive approach if one wishes to analyse a great variety of practices in light of their resistant function(s), it does raise the question of which cultural practices are not at least potentially acts of political resistance, and what descriptive power the term ‘resistance’ still holds if it can be equally applied to shopping and to anti-consumerist culture jamming, for example. as Duncombe himself points out, the concept ‘culture’ is partially the source of such an excess of meaning:3 here i’m referring to culture as a thing, there as a set of norms, behaviors and ways to make sense of the world, and in still other places, i’m describing culture as a process. … The term ‘cultural resistance’ is no firmer. in the following pages i use it to describe culture that is used, consciously or unconsciously, effectively or not, to resist and/or change the dominant political, economic and/or social structure. but cultural resistance, too, can mean many things and take on many forms. Combining ‘resistance’ with ‘poetics’ limits the scope of the practices under discussion. ‘poetics’—as distinct from ‘culture’—encourages a focus on individual creativity rather than on the wider category of cultural practices. Those are still discussed; however, in the contexts discussed here this is usually done in relation to poetic practices. The register of individuality and subjectivity that is linked with the term poetics, and the evocation of collectivity and community through the term resistance, places the practices and works under discussion in a tension between these categories. it encourages an analytical approach that considers the relationship between the work of art, the subjectivities of its creator(s) and of its recipients, and the social movements or political ideologies with which it is linked. The place of the work of art in the tension field between the subjective and the collective, and the relationality that the existence of this tension field necessarily entails, has emerged as one of the most important foci of the work of members of the network. The term ‘resistance’, in the way it is used by the network, needs further explanation. We use it with specific reference to neoliberalism, as one recent form of capitalism, while also maintaining an interest in practices of creative resistance to pre-neoliberal regimes of capital. This focus was chosen to facilitate the response to a very particular situation which is characterized by the implementation of a specific set of ideologically based policies while, at the same time, the existence of the ideological dimension is disavowed by policy makers. as eagleton points out, proponents of conservatism (we may apply this more concretely to neoliberalism) are wary of acknowledging its own ideological status, since ‘to dub their own beliefs ideological would be to risk turning them into objects of contestation’.4 neoliberalism thus pretends to be pragmatic rather than ideological; interested in policy rather than ideology. This pretence is made easier by neoliberalism having originally emerged as an economic theory. David harvey writes:5 neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. … but beyond these tasks the state should not venture. This ‘theory of political economic practices’ does, however, have ideological underpinnings which are crucially important to an understanding of neoliberalism’s impact on the arts, and also on scholarship. Those ideological underpinnings have become ever more obvious as the economic theory proves to be flawed, inadequate, and destructive. since the crisis of 2008, it has become ever more necessary for neoliberalism’s proponents to maintain the appearance of its overall coherence and effectiveness. ideology is indispensable for this. Other actors—not politicians—have to step in and provide the justification for the continuity of neoliberal politics. This justification draws on the previous ‘construction of consent’, as harvey calls it, and this draws increasingly on the pretension that ‘there is no alternative’. Culture in the widest sense plays a part in translating the ideological points outlined by harvey into more generalized assumptions, discursive figures, and commonly held beliefs. Thus, neoliberalism creates imaginaries that can then inform the creative imagination or that, conversely, are projected through works of art without this necessarily being the intention of the artist. The potentially complicit functions of art and scholarship and their co-optation, are important areas of interest of the members of the network. at the same time—and this interest is more prominently represented in the articles collected in this issue—the members of the network explore how works of art can effectively resist the imposition of neoliberal ideology and the absorption of art by neoliberal politics, either by creating alternative imaginaries or by contributing to and interacting with political projects that stand in opposition to the neoliberal model. This sometimes implies seeking spaces of artistic praxis ‘outside’ neoliberalism, but frequently involves entering into discursive, and sometimes financial, negotiation with neoliberallyinformed social, cultural and educational structures. for those of us working in higher education, as we will see below, such negotiation is an everyday reality. ConCepTualizinG ResisTanCe The decision to focus specifically on neoliberalism, and on poetics rather than culture, requires a re-conceptualization of resistance and, with reference to scholarship, a re- thinking of the critical approaches to the relationship between creativity and resistance. a brief discussion of influential theoretical works on poetry as a practice of resistance highlights why it is difficult to use these approaches to understand the work of art in times of neoliberalism. John beverley and Marc zimmerman’s analysis of poetry in the Central american revolutions was able to draw on a revolutionary and ideological practice that informed literature; barbara harlow in Resistance Literature establishes a connection between resistance in literature and anti-colonial liberation struggles; and Carolyn forché in Against Forgetting argues that the act of witnessing as an act of resistance against enforced oblivion translates into an act of political resistance. however, the insidious and gradual insertion of a supposedly non-ideological neoliberal imaginary into cultural imaginaries is not as easily identifiable as an act of oppression or persecution. The neoliberal imaginary does not explicitly endorse or justify violence, and therefore is more complex to resist or to contest. hardt and negri’s concepts of the global state of war and the global state of exception capture this elastic presence of violence and oppression. 6 The conceptualization of resistance is tied in with two further complexities: the place of the work of art in relation to resistance struggles, and the effectiveness of resistant works of art. both points are addressed in most essays in this issue, though authors come to different resolutions. The bearers of resistance struggles in the political sphere are some governments—for instance, those that form part of the bolivarian alternative for the americas (alba)—and a great variety of social movements. The emergence of new social movements as bearers of resistance struggles has opened up the question about the place of art and culture in relation to these movements. hardt and negri’s approach has been influential in this respect, and it is also exemplary of an approach with which members of the network struggle. in Empire, hardt and negri argue for an approach to culture that emphasizes its economic power:7 The various analyses of ‘new social movements’ have done a great service in insisting on the political importance of cultural movements against narrowly economic perspectives that minimize their significance. These analyses, however, are extremely limited themselves because … they perpetuate narrow understandings of the economic and the cultural. Most important, they fail to recognize the profound economic power of the cultural movements, or really the increasing indistinguishability of economic and cultural phenomena. on the one hand, capitalist relations were expanding to subsume all aspects of social production and reproduction, the entire realm of life; and on the other hand, cultural relations were redefining the production processes and economic structures of value. A regime of production, and above all a regime of the production of subjectivity, was being destroyed and another invented by the enormous accumulation of struggles.

#### 5 – Local to Global Bad – the question of this debate is which model translates collectives to overcome commoditization of dissent – the perm that scales up from “local” to “global” gets the direction of causality wrong by mystifying how world economies structure local relations – misdiagnosis turns solvency.

Engel-Di Mauro 9 – Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY New Paltz (Salvatore, “Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale”, Geoforum (2009):116-125)

Despite the emphasis on multiple scales of analysis, ‘‘webs of relation” (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007), ‘‘chains of explanation” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 27), ‘‘bottom-up” (Blaikie, 1985, p. 82), or ‘‘progressive contextualisation” (Vayda, 1983), most of the work in political ecology privileges spatio-temporally limited social contexts over longer-term, macro-scale social processes (Bridge, 2002, p. 371). While this may be the outcome of a recent distancing from political economy perspectives (Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 611), the problem was inherent from the very beginning, with a tendency to emphasise the ‘‘regional” or meso-scale (and then ‘‘local”, or micro-scale) as the starting unit of analysis. This analytical centring of smaller-scale dynamics has resulted in an inability to integrate general patterns and interconnections with ethnographic and eco- systemic data (Blaikie, 1999, p. 140; Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 612). This is far from saying that micro- or meso-specificity is less important than macro-specificity (the two are equally important in my view). Micro- and meso-level analysis is pivotal in under- standing people–environment relations, especially given that the most tangible occur largely over small areas. Yet emphasis on the smaller scale becomes a hindrance when it guides, rather than builds the empirical foundations of a research project. With few exceptions, political ecology continues to suffer from a methodological insis- tence on explaining people–environment relations through the analysis of smaller-scale circumstances and/or starting points. Planet-wide environmental and, since at least 500 years ago, social processes enable and/or constrain smaller-scale people–environment relations, especially with recent human-induced shifts in atmosphere composition (radiative forcing through greenhouse gas emissions, stratospheric ozone layer disruption through the emissions of bromines and chlorofluorocarbons, regional releases of atmospheric pollutants through burning vegetation and coal com- bustion, etc.). The scale of analysis adopted in a research project may depend on the kind of question one wishes to answer (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 65), but ultimately larger-scale processes must be included to arrive at explanations that go beyond appeals to complexity (Blaikie, 1985) or beyond eclecticism in the frameworks being combined (Blaikie, 1999, p. 139). The matter is exacerbated when phenomena in some parts of the whole are confused for evidence that negates either the existence of the entire system (or of any systemic process at all) or denies the possibility of a general theory on resource management (e.g., Black, 1990; Forsyth, 2003). There are other epistemological repercussions from such small locality-specific analyses and small-to-large scale approaches. One is treating places (or regions) as isolatable (often implicitly, by not paying attention to wider systemic processes), which enabled political ecology to circumscribe the range of social and environmental contexts to those far away from most political ecologists’ homes (McCarthy, 2002; Robbins, 2004). The underlying problem was reflected in the exclusion of places outside rural ‘‘third” world areas from the purview of political ecology (countries in the former state-socialist camp are still mostly ignored).2 Recent attention to wealthy industrialised capitalist societies and urban ecosystems is a helpful first step in moving political ecology away from a relatively narrow focus3 and into more promising cross-comparative terrain that can generate more systematic analy- sis (see works guest edited by Heynen and Robbins, 2005; Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Schroeder et al., 2006).

#### Hapticality link – Their description of undercommuning in the academy and collectivizing around touch is a link, not link turn – haptic intimacy seduces us into being complacent with the feeling of insurgency while institutionalizing radicalism into the corporate academy

Webb 18 Darren, education lecturer @ University of Sheffield, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies*, 40:2, pg. 96-108

But the undercommons is more than just the creation of spaces with utopian intent. It is a shifting matrix of spaces, processes, relations, and struc-tures of feeling. Harney and Moten do attach importance to teaching and the classroom—in particular as an opportunity to refuse the call to order—but the undercommons exists in institutional cracks outside the classroom: in stair-wells, in alleys, in kitchens, in corridors, in smoking areas, in hiding. The undercommons is a community of maroons, outcasts, and fugitives, not of responsible teachers. It is “always an unsafe neighbourhood” (Harney and Moten 2013, 28). In fact, the undercommons is best described as a way of being: a way of being within and against one’s institution and a way of being with and for the community of outcasts (Melamed 2016). Within and against the corporate-imperial university, the subversive intellectual is unprofessional, uncollegial, impractical, disruptive, disloyal, unproductive, unreliable, “obstructive and shiftless, dumb with insolence,” forever refusing the call to order (Harney and Moten 2013, 34). With and for the undercommons, hapticality describes a way of feeling that is at once unsettled—“to feel at home with the homeless, at ease with the fugitive, at peace with the pursued”—and intensely intimate—“the capacity to feel through others, for others to feel through you, for you to feel them feeling you” (97–98). Together, the maroons of the undercommons engage in study; a mode of sociality, “a kind of way of being with others,” walking and talking and thinking and working together “in a way that feels good, the way it should feel good” (111–112, 117).

There is a definite utopian project at work here. Moten tells us that “I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in that” (Harney and Moten 2013, 118). The undercommons is presented as an entry point to this other world in the world. It is a “utopic commonun-derground,” a utopia “submerged in the interstices and on the outskirts of the fierce and urgent now” (Moten 2008, 1746; Harney and Moten 2013, 51). The call to both disorder and to study—what Freire might have termed the utopian process of denunciation-annunciation—becomes an ontological enactment of something that is already here (Harney and Moten 2013, 133–134). For Harney in particular, the undercommons as a way of being can be understood in terms of rhythm. It is a new rhythm working against the global rhythm of work, the “global assembly line tearing apart the functions of man,” the rhythm of inputs and outputs every facet of which must be “measured and managed” (Harney 2015, 174–176). In contrast, the rhythm of the undercommons is “a militant arrhythmia” that unsettles the rhythm of the line, “invites us to feel around us” and brings the utopic commonunderground into the open (177–178).

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofes-sionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who ref-use, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.

Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work.

If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience ... the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines uto-pia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhyth-mia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents.

What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the insti-tution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more.

### AT: Future

#### Temporality Link – criticizing futurism because “time accumulates” for <<insert population>> is the surrender neolib loves – the 1AC is confined to affective self-valorization like <<insert their method: seduction, queer counter-publics, etc>> and the immediacy of locales which authorizes right-wing take-over – turns case.

Williams & Srnicek 13 (Alex, PhD student at the University of East London, presently at work on a thesis entitled 'Hegemony and Complexity', Nick, PhD candidate in International Relations at the London School of Economics, Co-authors of the forthcoming Folk Politics, 14 May 2013, <http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/> //shree)

At the begin­ning of the second dec­ade of the Twenty-​First Cen­tury, global civilization faces a new breed of cataclysm. These com­ing apo­ca­lypses ridicule the norms and organ­isa­tional struc­tures of the polit­ics which were forged in the birth of the nation-​state, the rise of cap­it­al­ism, and a Twen­ti­eth Cen­tury of unpre­ced­en­ted wars. 2. Most significant is the break­down of the planetary climatic system. In time, this threatens the continued existence of the present global human population. Though this is the most crit­ical of the threats which face human­ity, a series of lesser but potentially equally destabilising problems exist along­side and inter­sect with it. Terminal resource depletion, especially in water and energy reserves, offers the prospect of mass starvation, collapsing economic paradigms, and new hot and cold wars. Continued financial crisis has led governments to embrace the para­lyz­ing death spiral policies of austerity, privatisation of social welfare services, mass unemployment, and stagnating wages. Increasing automation in production processes includ­ing ‘intel­lec­tual labour’ is evidence of the secular crisis of capitalism, soon to render it incapable of maintaining current standards of living for even the former middle classes of the global north. 3. In con­trast to these ever-​accelerating cata­strophes, today’s politics is beset by an inability to generate the new ideas and modes of organisation necessary to transform our societies to confront and resolve the coming annihilations. While crisis gathers force and speed, politics withers and retreats. In this paralysis of the political imaginary, the future has been cancelled. 4. Since 1979, the hegemonic global political ideology has been neoliberalism, found in some vari­ant through­out the lead­ing eco­nomic powers. In spite of the deep struc­tural chal­lenges the new global prob­lems present to it, most imme­di­ately the credit, fin­an­cial, and fiscal crises since 2007 – 8, neoliberal programmes have only evolved in the sense of deep­en­ing. This continuation of the neo­lib­eral pro­ject, or neo­lib­er­al­ism 2.0, has begun to apply another round of structural adjustments, most sig­ni­fic­antly in the form of encour­aging new and aggress­ive incur­sions by the private sec­tor into what remains of social demo­cratic insti­tu­tions and ser­vices. This is in spite of the immediately negative eco­nomic and social effects of such policies, and the longer term fun­da­mental bar­ri­ers posed by the new global crises. 5. That the forces of right wing governmental, non-​governmental, and corporate power have been able to press forth with neoliberalisation is at least in part a result of the continued para­lysis and ineffectual nature of much what remains of the left. Thirty years of neoliberalism have rendered most left-​leaning political parties bereft of radical thought, hol­lowed out, and without a popular mandate. At best they have responded to our present crises with calls for a return to a Keynesian economics, in spite of the evidence that the very conditions which enabled post-​war social democracy to occur no longer exist. We can­not return to mass industrial-​Fordist labour by fiat, if at all. Even the neo­socialist regimes of South America’s Bolivarian Revolu­tion, whilst heart­en­ing in their abil­ity to res­ist the dog­mas of con­tem­por­ary cap­it­al­ism, remain disappointingly unable to advance an alternative beyond mid-​Twentieth Century socialism. Organised labour, being systematically weakened by the changes wrought in the neo­liberal project, is scler­otic at an insti­tu­tional level and — at best — capable only of mildly mitigating the new structural adjustments. But with no systematic approach to building a new economy, or the structural solidarity to push such changes through, for now labour remains rel­at­ively impotent. The new social movements which emerged since the end of the Cold War, exper­i­en­cing a resur­gence in the years after 2008, have been similarly unable to devise a new political ideological vision. Instead they expend considerable energy on internal direct-​democratic process and affective self-​valorisation over strategic efficacy, and frequently propound a variant of neo-​primitivist localism, as if to oppose the abstract violence of globalised capital with the flimsy and ephemeral “authenticity” of communal immediacy. 6. In the absence of a radically new social, political, organisational, and economic vision the hegemonic powers of the right will continue to be able to push forward their narrow-​minded imaginary, in the face of any and all evidence. At best, the left may be able for a time to partially resist some of the worst incursions. But this is to be Canute against an ultimately irresistible tide. To generate a new left global hegemony entails a recovery of lost possible futures, and indeed the recovery of the future as such.

#### Affect Link – focus on post-nuclear forces like a structure of feeling reduces labor and being in common to creative, spiritual relations beyond the concrete – this displacement of materialism and expansion of feeling is inseparable from compassionate capitalism that amplifies alienation of labor and tricks the masses into mass exodus from institutions which occupy centers of power

Cotter 16 – Professor of English at William Jewell [Jennifer, “The New Class Common-Sense: Biopolitics, Posthumanism, and Love,” in Cotter, K. DeFazio, R. Faivre, A. Sahay, J. Torrant, S. Tumino, &, R. Wilkie (eds.) *All Too (Post)Human: The Humanities after Humanism*, Lexington Books, pp. 25-32]

The return in contemporary cultural theory to focus on questions of "love" and "affect" is an articulation of the fact that love is a social emotion and an integral part of culture that is useful for reproducing the social relations of production. Love, and different forms of love, therefore becomes a site of conflict and struggle in cultural theory and in daily life precisely because of the relation of love to material relations. This relation continues today: as class contradictions in capitalism have intensified and more family members have been pulled into the wage-work force, capital also puts pressure on the nuclear-family form insofar as it has begun to serve as a barrier for capital to extract more surplus-labor from the existing workforce. As a consequence a "new" flexible, "post-nuclear," and "posthuman" -but not post-class-sexual and moral code of love is emerging. The old morality of love is serving as a hindrance in many cases to the intensification of the exploitation of workers' surplus-labor around the world. The new spiritualism of "love" -in both its biopolitical and transspecies posthumanist variations -is at root an ideological purging of "old" moral codes of love and sexuality once useful to the ruling class during an earlier stage in the development of capitalism and bringing about new moral codes of love and sexuality useful for adjusting workers to the intensification of class contradictions in transnational capitalism now. And yet, biopolitical theories of love ideologically invert the relationship of these new "post-nuclear" and "post-human" moral codes of love to the material relations of production and posit new forms of love as themselves constituting new material relations in society. In concealing the relationship of love to class relations and diverting attention away from the need to transform the material relations of production, these spiritualist theories of love also conceal the fact that the "new" "post-nuclear" forms of love and sexuality they promote are not a break from capitalist relations of production, but an updating of its social relations of reproduction to adjust workers to the intensification of class contradictions now.

In the discourses of biopolitics, love is abstracted from its relation to the material relations of production and grasped primarily as a transsocial affective and spiritual "life force" that "creates" and brings into being new social forms. Love is "spiritualized." It is represented as a "creative life force" that will heal social alienation in capitalism -which has its origin in the material contradictions of production in capitalism - without actually transforming the material relations of production founded on exploitation. For example, in Commonwealth Hardt and Negri argue that "love" is a "biopolitical event" that "produces the common." 38 In other words, their claim is that love brings about new social relations that break from private property and bring about a "commonwealth." To understand their claims about "love as a biopolitical event" that brings about a change in material relations, it is first necessary to understand what Hardt and Negri mean by "biopolitics." Drawing on Foucault's theory of biopower, they make a distinction between "biopower" and "biopolitics." Hardt and Negri deploy the concept of "biopower" to refer to the "disciplinary regimes, architectures of power, and the applications of power through distributed and capillary networks" that are the subject of Foucault's investigations and that he argues do not "repress" but "produce" subjectivities. 39 Hardt and Negri point out that "biopower," although considered by Foucault to be productive of subjectivities rather than "repressive" of pre-existing subjectivities, is nonetheless a concept which discusses regimes of "power over life." 40 By contrast, Hardt and Negri use another term, "biopolitics," to refer to what they regard as "the other to power (or even an other power)." 41 They contend that "there is always a minor current that insists on life as resistance, an other power of life that strives toward an alternative existence." 42 In other words, in contrast to "biopower" which is "power over life," "biopolitics," in Hardt and Negri' s theorization of it, is the "power of life" and, more specifically, the "power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity" which "not only resists power but also seeks autonomy from it." 43 Hardt and Negri not only understand "biopolitics" as a striving toward autonomy, but as having an autonomous origin that transcends the historical and material relations of society: "the biopower against which we struggle is not comparable in its nature to the form of power by which we defend and seek our freedom." 44

"Biopolitics" -as Hardt and Negri understand it as the "power of life to resist" -is at root a theory of "creative life force," or what Spinoza calls potenza and Hemi Bergson calls elan vital, which has its philosophical roots in spiritual creationisms. "Biopolitics" with its reliance on an autonomous "power of life" to "resist" is a spiritualizing of the dialectical praxis of labor and an erasure of the material relations of production. It translates what Marx calls the "dialectical praxis of labor" into spiritualist terms by abstracting "life" from its material conditions of possibility and ideologically converting productive activity or labor-which exists in a necessary relation to the relations of production -into an autonomous "creativity."

The existence of "life," which is to say "the existence of living human individuals," and the "power to resist" presupposes material conditions which can enable and sustain human life. This is the case since men and women "must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history"'; they must be in a position to satisfy needs of "eating and drinking [ ... ] habitation, clothing and many other things." 45 In order to satisfy needs to sustain human life, the existence of human life is not only dependent on the means of subsistence, but on labor. Labor is, as Engels puts it, not only the source of all wealth but "next to nature," he argues, "it is the prime basic condition for all human existence." 46 There is no "human existence" that is prior to labor and labor is itself not outside of history; it is a dialectical and material relation:

Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature. 47

The existence of human "life" and its course of development never exists independently of the material conditions of production prevailing at the time (the forces of production) and the social relations within which this production takes place (the relations of production or property relations). And these conditions and relations are themselves the product of past labor and, in tum, shape the course of all other aspects of social life. But labor conditions never remain static: as the forces of production develop this results in the production and satisfaction of new needs which come into direct contradiction with the relations of production, requiring transformation in the relations of production. Human existence is not prior to the social "metabolism" between the forces of production and the relations within which this production takes place and are transformed. As Marx and Engels argue,

The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations[ ... ] [T]he social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, however, of these individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imaginations, but as they actually are, i.e., as they act, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions, independent of their will. 48

Biopolitics, by abstracting life from the material relations of production and the dialectical praxis of labor, puts forward an understanding of the "power of life" as limitless. In erasing the relation of necessity between "life" and the dialectical praxis of labor, one of the goals of biopolitics and its ideological renewing of spiritual creationism is, as I discuss further below, to update the contemporary workforces of capitalism to increase their productivity (under the banner of the "power of life") without eradicating exploitation in production. Raising productivity without eradicating exploitation means raising the rate of exploitation of workers with the aim of raising the rate of profit for capital.

By theorizing love as a "biopolitical event," Hardt and Negri understand love as a trans-material, trans-social, and trans-historical "creative life force." At the core of this view is a re-writing of the "social" as ontological. They argue that love, as a biopolitical event, is "productive" by which they mean that it produces "new subjectivities" and "singularities" and, they add, it is productive of new social forms and relations: "When we engage in the production of subjectivity that is love, we are not merely creating new objects or even new subjects in the world. Instead we are producing a new world, a new social life." 49 What Hardt and Negri call relations of "production" are actually relations of reproduction. In their theory, the relations of reproduction in capitalism - and specifically the ideological reproduction of subjectivities and the relations through which this takes place - are considered to be the material terrain of social transformation and freedom. The actual material relations of production-the labor and property relations by which social wealth is produced- and the relationship of love to these relations of production are inverted and hidden from view.

The assumption of this theory is that capitalism is held in place at root not by its material relations of production but by the reproduction of subjectivities who will adjust to and participate in capitalist production. Moreover, by this logic, change in subjectivities-or subjective change is taken to constitute material change as an end in itself. In this narrative subjective change and more specifically, the mere act of "loving" –or "loving differently" -is regarded as an end in itself that "constitutes" new social relations: "love is a process of production of the common and production of subjectivity. This process is not merely a means to producing material goods and other necessities but also an end in itself." 50 No transformation outside of "loving differently" and transforming the forms of affective relations is, according to this theory, necessary in order to bring about human freedom. In this theory, not only are the relations of production ideologically "dematerialized" but so are the relations of reproduction themselves. When Hardt and Negri appear to make references to "love" and "love relations" as "social," they do not mean by this that love-and the form that it takes-presupposes specific social relations and material conditions of possibility, rather they theorize "love" as a transsocial and immaterial life force that brings into being new social forms. Love, they claim, is at root an "ontological event" that constitutes being and reality as such:

Every act of love, one might say, is an ontological event in that it marks a rupture with existing being and creates new being [...] Being, after all, is just another way of saying what is ineluctably common, what refuses to be privatized or enclosed and remains constantly open to all. (There is no such thing as a private ontology.) To say that love is ontologically constitutive then, simply means that it produces the common. 51

Love, in this argument, is not only outside of social relations but "creates" them. Social relations in other words presuppose love. Love, in this narrative, is both origin (arche) and end (telos) of reality, or Being as such. At different points in their narrative Hardt and Negri refer to love as: an "economic power," an affective network, a biopolitical event, a biopolitical force which creates and brings into being new social forms, a force which composes singularities (differences) within the common, and the basis of ontology or Being as such. 52 In short, in Commonwealth, love is understood in theological and spiritualist terms: it is regarded to be all powerful, all encompassing, absolute reality that creates all that is and all that will ever be. It is ideologically "cleansed" from its actual relation to the material relations of production.

To complete their theological sermon on the "power of love," Hardt and Negri argue that love is a "force to combat evil." 53 Here Hardt and Negri deploy the theological concept of "evil" in place of a rigorous historical materialist analysis of material contradictions. Having ideologically displaced the dialectical praxis of labor as the basis of social forms with "love" as a creative life force, the deployment of the concept of "evil" now enables Hardt and Negri to displace analytical critique of private property relations and exploitation as an explanation of social inequality with a theory of moral and panhistorical "corruption." In Hardt and Negri, "evil" is understood as the "corruption" of love and the common or what they elsewhere call "love gone bad":

Our proposition [...] is to conceive of evil as a derivative and distortion of love and the common. Evil is the corruption of love that creates an obstacle to love, or to say the same thing with a different focus, evil is the corruption of the common that blocks its production and productivity. Evil thus has no originary or primary existence but stands only in a secondary position to love. 54

According to Hardt and Negri' s logic, since love is an ontological category that constitutes "being" and at the same time is a creative life force that brings into being new social forms, "love" brings about all social relations. Thus, social relations which are unequal are, so the story goes, best "explained" as the "corruption" of love or what they also call "love gone bad." To this end, they suggest that "As soon as we identify love with the production of the common, we need to recognize that, just like the common, love is deeply ambivalent and susceptible to corruption." 55 On these terms, Hardt and Negri posit that "capitalism" too, like all social forms is at root made possible by love, but a "love gone bad." 56 Capitalism, in their view, is not an historical relation based on private property relations and the exploitation of labor-power-the theft of surplus labor in production. Rather, they argue that capitalism and its alienating effects are best explained as a form of "love gone bad," by which they mean as a form of "corruption."

More specifically, according to Hardt and Negri, the "corruption" of love is manifested in "identitarian love" or "love of the same" rather than "love of difference." Race love, nation love, patriotism, romantic love, marriage-couple love are, for Hardt and Negri, examples of "love of the same." 57 As an "antidote" to love of the same, Hardt and Negri expand upon the concept of "love thy neighbor," and following Nietzsche they argue that higher than love of neighbor is "love of the farthest." 58 Here Hardt and Negri reduce social transformation to moral platitudes and lessons in multiculturalism and "loving difference." In doing so they erase the fact that exploitation under capitalism is the root cause of inequality and, as well, exploitation is entirely compatible with "love of the farthest" as transnational capitalism goes "all over the globe" and "must settle everywhere, nestle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere" not only to expand its markets but to secure sources of exploitable laborpower to stave off declines in profit. 59 What Hardt and Negri then propose as the "solution" to "love gone bad" or "love of the same" and toward the "common" is not social transformation but a "mass exodus" from institutions of the family, the nation, the corporation, and so on. As a "force to combat evil," Hardt and Negri contend, "love now takes the form of indignation, disobedience, and antagonism. Exodus is one means [ ... ] of combating the corrupt institutions of the common, subtracting from claims of identity, fleeing from subordination and servitude." 60

Hardt and Negri's argument for a "mass exodus" from "old/bad" forms of love is, as I explicate further below, an updating of the culture of capitalism-of the methods used to help reproduce the social relations of production founded on exploitation - and not a break from capitalism. However, before further examining Hardt and Negri' s theory of "love," "evil," "corruption," and "exodus" and their ideological role in transnational capitalism now, it is first necessary to understand the genealogy of Hardt and Negri' s theory in classic idealism. This is important both because Hardt and Negri overtly claim to be producing a "materialist" theory and because their theory is taken by others as a "new" "true" materialism. Materialism, broadly, is the explanation of the origin of existence on the basis of exclusively material relations and laws of motion. When Hardt and Negri claim that love is "ontological" and constitutive of "Being," this does not mean that they are working with a materialist understanding of love. Despite their claims for a "materialist teleology" 61 and a "materialist perspective," 62 at its core Hardt and Negri's theory of love and the "common" is not actually an historical updating of materialism for new material conditions of production that are in the process of formation, but an ideological updating of classic Christian idealist (spiritualist) ontology in which the "real" is represented as grounded in the ideal or spiritual. This can be seen not only in their direct references to St. Paul's theology, but in how closely Hardt and Negri's theory of "love as being" and "love as a force to combat evil" resembles Augustine of Hippos' classic Christian idealist ontology of "God as being" and of "good" and "evil" and their "relation" to each other. In classic Christian ontology, "God is being" and is the "real." More specifically, the concept of God, in classic Christianity, is understood as absolute spirit: the allpowerful, immutable, ineffable, excessive, and unquantifiable divine life force. This concept of absolute spirit, moreover, is regarded to be the absolute basis of the real as such and is regarded as "supremely good." In this theory of being, the concrete and sensuous world of the earth is considered to be an effect of God. The world, in other words, according to this ontology is "God's creation" and God is its "life force." However, according to classic Christian ontology, "God" is regarded to compose or create but is not contained in the world. In other words, for Augustine, the divine creator is not the creation. To put this another way, in classical Christian ontology, the world is not seen as "God incarnate" because, in this theory of ontology, "God" is an immaterial, divine force which cannot be incarnated. In this view, "God" as absolute spirit is outside any terms of empirical measurement, not contained in or by any material, concrete, or sensuous form or relation. In the Confessions, for example, Augustine remarks that "truth says to me: Your God is not heaven or earth or any kind of bodily thing." 63 Although, in the course of the Confessions, Augustine formally rejects the theories of Plato and ancient Greek philosophy in general, his theory of "God" at the same time derives from Plato's concept of ideal forms and the theory of ontology of which it is a part. In Republic, Book X, for example, Plato distinguishes between an "ideal form," which he argues is the product of "God" and is the one "true" form; the concrete or material form manufactured by an artisan, which Plato regards to be a copy of the ideal form; and the image or representational form (as in painting or poetry) produced by what Plato regards to be an "imitator" of the concrete. In this theory of ontology the ideal form is the basis of being. The concrete form produced by human labor is considered to be a lesser copy of the ideal form produced by God, and the image or representation of the concrete form is regarded by Plato to be an even lesser copy of a copy-an "imitation" of a copy-of the ideal form. 64